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THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRESCHOOLERS’ LIVING KINDS CONCEPT: A
LONGITUDINAL STUDY

By
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Ph.D., Psychology, University of New Mexico, 2014
ABSTRACT
The overarching goal of this study was to examine the structural organization of
preschoolers’ living kinds concept and the nature of developmental change in that concept from
roughly 3.5- to 4.5-years-old. Specifically, this study was designed to assess whether
preschoolers’ living kind conceptual development involves progressive elaboration of an existing
biologically based skeletal framework or conceptual reorganization. Unlike previous studies,
this study employed a longitudinal design, an extensive stimulus set, alternate indices of
understanding, and complementary statistical analyses. Thirty-five 3.0- to 3.5-year-olds
participated in four testing sessions over the course of one year; each testing session included
three phases that involved four object classes: plants, animals, mobile and immobile objects. The
phases involved statements participants generated relative to the four classes, what biological
and psychological properties they attributed to the classes, their assignment of “alive” to the
classes, and their answers to open-ended questions about living kinds. By examining
preschoolers’ responding in the different testing contexts over time and examining the
relationship of responding across testing context and across the domains of biological and
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psychological understanding, this study was able to assess the structure of preschoolers’ living
kinds concept and whether that structure is organizationally stable or labile during the preschool
period. Results suggest that certain aspects of a mature, biologically based framework are in
place early in the preschool period while other aspects have not yet been developmentally
constructed and that the nature of the developmental change that takes place between roughly 3.5
to 4.5 years involves both progressive elaboration of an existing biologically based skeletal
framework and organizational restructuring.
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Introduction
The distinction between living things (such as, plants and animals) and person-made
things (such as, tools and toys) is essential for our understanding of the world. If we know
something is alive, we can assume that it engages in biological processes, such as growing and
needing nutrients. If we know something is person-made, we can assume that it was designed to
serve a function. The question of how a living kinds concept develops in early childhood has
been extensively investigated since Piaget’s (1929) seminal work, The Child’s Conception of the
World, particularly within the last 30 years. Despite considerable research in this area, however,
a basic developmental question remains open to debate: how is preschoolers’ conceptualization
of living and nonliving things structured, and to what extent does this structural organization
undergo transformative changes during the preschool period? Continued debate in this literature
over the very nature of preschoolers’ living kinds understanding stems from both theoretical
considerations and methodological limitations.
Theoretical Considerations
Two distinct theoretical accounts currently inform the question of what constitutes the
nature of children’s living kinds understanding and its development. By one account,
preschoolers’ living kinds conceptualization is qualitatively different from that of adults,
suggesting that a developmental reorganization must occur in order for children’s living kinds
conceptualization to be organized along the same lines as adults. As the foundation for this
account, Piaget (1929) argued that young children initially conflate livingness with motion,
resulting in their over extending the label of alive to nonliving entities that display motion (i.e.,
bicycles) and their under extending the label of alive to living entities that do not display motion
(i.e., plants). For Piaget, not until the concrete operational period and beyond (i.e., well into the
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later portions of middle childhood) has a child’s conceptualization undergone sufficient
reorganization such that the child no longer conflates motion with life but has a mature
understanding of living kinds as distinct from nonliving kinds.
Like Piaget, Carey (1985) has argued for a qualitative reorganization taking place during
childhood in living kinds conceptualization; but unlike Piaget, Carey has targeted a transition in
thinking from preschoolers’ incorrect reliance on naive psychology to school aged children’s
correct reliance on naïve biology for judging livingness. For Carey, preschoolers conflate
livingness with psychological agency and frame life in uniquely psychological rather than
broadly biological terms; only by late childhood does this conceptualization undergo thorough
reorganization to more adequately reflect the biologically oriented living kinds understanding of
the adult.
An alternative theoretical account to both Piaget and Carey argues against the idea of
qualitative reorganization in children’s living kinds understanding, promoting instead a core
competence view of living kinds conceptual development. For Keil (1994; Keil, Levin,
Richman, & Gutheil, 1999) and others (e.g., Greif, Kemler Nelson, Keil, & Gutierrez, 2006;
Inagaki & Hatano, 2002; Leddon, Waxman, & Medin, 2008; Waxman, 2005), the basic
biological framework for differentiating living and nonliving kinds is already evident in the
preschool period and, though skeletal in nature, provides the young child with an abstract set of
regularities for organizing the living world (Erickson, Keil, & Lockhart, 2010). By this
approach, conceptual development proceeds not by means of major shifts in the structural
organization of the living kinds concept, but by means of a progressive elaboration of a
framework that is similar in organization yet impoverished when compared to that of adults.
(e.g., Inagaki & Hatano, 2002; Leddon et al., 2008; Keil, 1992; Waxman, 2005).

2

Over the last two decades, broad consensus has emerged in favor of the core competence
approach over the qualitative reorganization approach to preschoolers’ living kinds
conceptualization (Inagaki & Hatano, 2006). Research investigating preschoolers’
understanding of the commonalities among living things has demonstrated that preschoolers
clearly group living things with respect to biological properties. Specifically, they correctly
assert that both animals and plants grow, (Inagaki & Hatano, 1996; Rosengren, Gelman, Kalish
& McCormick, 1991) and, when damaged, can recover through regrowth (Backscheider, Shatz &
Gelman, 1993); they attribute the need for nourishment to plants and animals (Inagaki & Hatano,
1996, 2002); and they apply the biological property of death to plants and animals, but not to
person-made objects (Nguyen & Gelman, 2002; Waxman, 2005). Research investigating
preschoolers’ understanding of how living entities differ from person-made objects has
demonstrated that preschoolers also conceptually distinguish living kinds from nonliving objects.
Children as young as 3-years-old recognize that properties of biological kinds enhance survival,
whereas properties of person-made objects largely function to benefit people (Keil, 1992, 1994);
these children furthermore privilege functional information when encountering novel objects
and biological classification information when encountering novel animals (Greif et al., 2006).
Brandone and Gelman (2013) have argued that by 5-years-old, children are making principled,
theory-laden domain distinctions between animals and objects.
Nonetheless, this understanding of commonalities among and differences between living
and nonliving kinds does not translate into reliable integration of plants with animals or
classification of plants as alive (e.g., Carey, 1985; Meunier & Cordier 2004; Richards & Siegler,
1984). Children have difficulty with the concept “alive,” and when asked to categorize objects
on the basis of “alive,” young children systematically exclude plants (Carey, 1985; Opfer &
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Siegler, 2004; Waxman, 2005). Even first year high school students rate animals as alive at
much higher rates than plants (Yorek, Sahin & Aydin, 2009).
From Piaget’s (1929) and Carey’s (1985) vantage point of qualitative reorganization in
the development of children’s living kinds conceptualization, the fact that young children have
difficulty correctly applying the concept “alive”—evidenced by their seldom judging plants as
alive and often judging mobile person-made objects as living—highlights the qualitative
difference between preschoolers’ and adults’ living kinds conceptualization. Such results
demonstrate that children understand the living world in fundamentally different terms than
adults and that it is not until the child’s conceptualization has undergone sufficient
reorganization that children will reliably classify both plants and animals as living things.
For those who favor the core competence approach (e.g., Anggoro, Waxman & Medin,
2008; Leddon et al., 2008; Opfer & Gelman, 2001; Opfer & Siegler, 2004), the fact that young
children have difficulty with classifying objects as “alive” demonstrates that the concept of
“alive” is simply a detail of the skeletal biological framework that has not yet been worked-out
or elaborated for the preschooler. Opfer and colleagues (Opfer & Gelman, 2001; Opfer &
Siegler, 2004), for example, have argued that young children’s failure to recognize plants as
animate—few preschoolers realize that plants possess the capacity for movement and do so to
sustain life (e.g., growing towards the sun)—plays a role in their difficulty unifying plants and
animals into a living kinds concept, because they lack the understanding that plants as well as
animals move in goal-directed ways. Therefore, until children work out the detail that plants
engage in goal-directed movements, which Opfer and Siegler (2004) have argued does not occur
until 7 years of age, children will not classify plants as living.
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Similarly, Waxman and colleagues (Leddon et al., 2008; Anggoro et al., 2008) have
explained the problems that children have integrating plants with animals and considering plants
alive as primarily due to linguistic issues. For Waxman and colleagues, the word “animal” in the
English language has at least two distinct conceptual meanings and, as such, poses a unique
interpretive challenge for young children learning English, resulting in their not classifying
plants as things that are alive. In one meaning, “animal” includes humans and animals
(animal_inclusive); this meaning subsumes the other meaning of “animal” which refers to
animals only (animal_exclusive). Given that words serve as catalysts in object categorization
and that children prefer to assign different words to different categories (Waxman & Lidz, 2006),
in order to avoid mapping the same word (“animal”) on to the two hierarchically nested
concepts, children erroneously map the word “alive” onto the concept animal_inclusive and
classify the subordinate concepts “human” and “animal_exclusive” as things which are “alive”
(See Figure 1). Waxman and colleagues (Leddon et al. 2008; Anggoro et al. 2008) assert that
because both humans and animals are animate things, children essentially equate the concept
“alive” with the concept “animate” (things which self-initiate and sustain movement). Because
plants are not overtly observably animate things, children do not classify them as things that are
“alive.” Therefore, when researchers investigate young children’s living kinds understanding
and use the word “alive,” as is often done, it masks children’s true understanding. Indeed,
Waxman and colleague’s (Leddon et al., 2008) research comparing English-speaking children’s
responding when the word “alive” is used and when the word “living thing” is used, showed that
6- and 7-year-old children attribute life status to plants at higher rates when the word “living
thing” is used rather than the word “alive.” Furthermore, Waxman and colleague’s cross
linguistic study (Anggoro et al., 2008), which compared English speaking children and
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Indonesian speaking children—because in the Indonesian language “animal” only refers to the
concept of animal (animal_exclusive)—found that that Indonesian-speaking 9-year-old children
showed more precocious application of “alive” by grouping plants with animals and humans as
living kinds at a higher rate than their English speaking counterparts.
Is the classification of objects as “alive” an integral part of a core living kinds concept, or
is it a more subsidiary detail? Do problems with the concept of “alive” reflect fundamental
conceptual differences in younger children, or are they just reflective of minor content or
processing issues? Although these theoretical considerations may never be fully adjudicated at
an empirical level, methodological limitations in the literature further hamper efforts to answer
even the most basic questions concerning children’s living kinds conceptualization and the
nature of its development.
Methodological Limitations
One problem with much of the existing research on children’s living kinds
conceptualization is that although it is extensive and thorough in its methodological precision, it
is limited in its integrative scope and therefore limited in the conclusions that can be drawn.
First, individual studies routinely isolate certain subclasses of the living-nonliving kinds
distinction. For example, Brandone and Gelman (2013) employed animals and artifacts but not
plants. Greif et al. (2006) employed animals and inanimate objects but not plants and animate
artifacts. Jipson and Gelman (2007) employed animals, animate and inanimate objects but not
plants, and Opfer and colleagues (Opfer & Gelman, 2001; Opfer & Siegler, 2004) focused on
plants and animals but excluded from consideration person-made objects, both mobile and
immobile. Second, individual studies isolate certain biological processes to the exclusion of
others. For example, Backscheider et al. (1993) focused on children’s understanding of regrowth
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while Nguyen and Gelman (2002) focused on children’s understanding of death, and Waxman
and colleagues (Leddon et al., 2008; Anggoro et al., 2008) focused on children’s understanding
of alive. Third, individual studies often employ only one methodological index to assess
children’s living kinds understanding,relying either on children’s responses to questions posed
by the experimenter (e.g., Backscheider et al., 1993; Nguyen & Gelman, 2002; Opfer & Gelman,
2001; Opfer & Siegler, 2004) or on the questions / statements children generate about living and
nonliving kinds (e.g. Brandone & Gelman, 2013; Greif et al., 2006). Fourth, nearly all research
examining children’s living kinds concept has employed a cross-sectional design and, therefore,
cannot adequately address the issue of the nature of developmental change over time. Finally, too
often individual studies collapse across ages in the preschool period (e.g., Greif et al., 2006;
Jipson & Gelman, 2007; Kemler Nelson, Egan, & Holt, 2001), further limiting the conclusions
that can be drawn regarding the nature of developmental change during the preschool years.
Without looking at children’s living kinds understanding (1) across a broad spectrum of living
and nonliving classes, (2) across a broad spectrum of biological and psychological process, (3)
across testing contexts, and (4) across time, all within the same sample, the conclusions
regarding the nature of preschooler’s living kinds understanding and its development are limited.
To overcome some of these limitations, my previous work (Margett & Witherington,
2011) investigated preschoolers’ living kinds conceptualization by employing an extensive
stimulus set and alternate indices of understanding. Preschoolers completed three testing phases
involving four object classes: plants, animals, mobile and immobile objects. The phases
involved inquiries preschoolers’ generated, what biological properties they attributed and their
assignment of “alive” to the four classes. The broad spectrum of class types and alternate
methodologies revealed both competence and gaps in preschoolers’ living kinds
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conceptualization. Preschoolers in each of the three phases largely distinguished between the
animals and immobile objects; however, when representatives of the nonliving class that
involved clearly observable movement (mobile objects) and representatives of the living class
that lacked clearly observable movement (plants) were considered, preschoolers’ clear
understanding of the distinction between living and nonliving kinds broke down to reveal some
measure of confusion. Specifically, preschoolers (1) generated more functional
questions/statements (q/s) for immobile objects and more biological q/s for mobile objects; (2)
attributed the need for food to the animal class at a higher rate relative to the plant class; and (3)
classified animals as living at a higher rate than plants and classified immobile objects as
nonliving at a higher rate than mobile objects.
My previous work (Margett & Witherington, 2011) also looked at preschoolers’ living
kinds concept by examining their responding across methodological indices. I found no
evidence that preschoolers’ concept of alive was related to the type of q/s they generated in
response to different classes of objects. Neither did I find evidence that preschoolers’ concept of
alive was associated with their conceptualization of biological properties like growth, need for
water and food. However, I did find some evidence that preschoolers’ concept of alive and their
conceptualization of biological properties across object kinds (living vs. nonliving) is related.
For example, the more likely preschoolers were to say animals were alive, the less likely they
were to say mobile or immobile objects grow, need water or food, and the less likely
preschoolers were to say mobile or immobile objects were alive, the more likely they were to say
animals and plants grow. Furthermore, preschoolers’ conceptualization of biological properties
and their finding functional and/or biological information conceptually salient were related. For
example, the less likely preschoolers were to say the immobile objects grow, the less likely they
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were to make biological q/s and the more likely they were to make functional q/s about that
class. In addition, the more likely preschoolers were to say animals grow, the more likely they
were to make functional q/s about the mobile objects. Lastly, the less likely preschoolers were to
say mobile objects need food, the more likely they were to make functional q/s and the less likely
they were to make biological q/s about the immobile objects.
The above results provide some evidence that preschoolers’ responding across phases is
related, suggesting that preschoolers are able to employ a biologically appropriate abstract set of
regularities for differentiating and organizing the living and nonliving world, as Erickson et al.
(2010), Keil (1994; Keil et al., 1999) and Waxman (2005) have outlined. While my previous
study (Margett & Witherington, 2011) added to understanding of the nature of preschoolers’
living kinds conceptualization by employing a broad set of stimuli and alternate indices of
preschoolers’ comprehension, the results are really only relevant to the characterization of the
typical 4-year-old’s living kinds conception, as I collapsed across the 3- to 5-year age range,
treating the 3- to 5-year-old participants as a single group. The mean age of participants was 4
years 3 months, and the sample consisted of relatively few 3 and 5 year olds, insufficient
numbers to allow for adequate testing of age differences within the 3 to 5 grouping. While
studying this age range as a single group is consistent with recent work on preschoolers’ naïve
biology (e.g., Greif et al., 2006; Jipson & Gelman, 2007; Kemler Nelson et al., 2001), it may not
be warranted, given that the period between 3 and 4 years has reliably been established as
involving major developmental changes in the organization of preschoolers’ conceptualization,
across multiple domains of cognition.
Piaget, for example, distinguished the 3- to 5-year-old period as a transitional period in
children’s logical reasoning skills, wherein children by 4 to 5 years of age begin demonstrating a
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growing conceptualization characterized by pockets of competence that resemble later concrete
operational cognitive abilities (Piaget, 1947). Wellman, Cross and Watson’s (2001) metaanalysis on the development of Theory of Mind in children has pointed to a clear transition
between 3 and 4 years in preschooler’s Theory of Mind development indexed by the emergence
of false belief understanding. Povinelli and Simon’s research (1998; see also Povinelli, Landau,
& Perilloux, 1996; Povinelli, Landry, Theall, Clark, & Castille, 1999) on preschoolers’
recognition of self across time has identified the emergence of a temporally extended,
autobiographical self between 3 and 4 years, with children by 4 to 5 years, but not at 3 years,
able to interpret a briefly delayed video presentation of themselves as themselves. More
recently, Einav and Robinson (2011) have demonstrated a transition taking place between 3 and
4 years in children’s ability to distinguish a knowledgeable source from an unknowledgeable
source, with 4- and 5-year-olds more likely to trust information from a knowledgeable source but
with 3-year-olds equally likely to trust a knowledgeable source as a source who is just repeating
facts.
Together, the above mentioned research lends strong support to the view that conceptual
reorganization occurs across a broad range of cognitive domains between 3 and 4 years of age,
with children showing marked differences in their logical reasoning, understanding of Theory of
Mind, self-recognition, and recognition of knowledgeable sources. Given the abundance of work
demonstrating a major developmental change occurring between 3 and 4 years, a more
systematic investigation of potential organizational change taking place between 3 and 4 years in
preschoolers’ living kinds conceptualization is clearly warranted. It remains unclear if a
biologically based, skeletal framework for distinguishing living kinds from nonliving kinds
characterizes all of the preschool period or whether such a framework is being developmentally
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constructed between 3 and 4 years. It is possible that 3-year-olds’ conceptual framework for
distinguishing living from nonliving kinds is not biologically based as it is in the older
preschooler and adult and that conceptual reorganization, rather than simply the filling in of
details for an already existing, biologically mature skeletal framework, better characterizes
development during the early preschool period. Conclusions that the typical preschooler
possesses a skeletal biological framework for distinguishing living kinds from nonliving kinds
are premature without more systematic developmental investigation of the preschool period
between 3 and 5 years.
Current Study
I designed the current study to offer a more complete assessment of what constitutes the
nature of preschooler’s living kinds concept and its development during the preschool period.
The current study extended my previous methodology (Margett & Witherington, 2011) by (1)
employing a longitudinal design with four testing sessions conducted over the course of
approximately one year; (2) asking children to reason about psychological properties in addition
to biological properties; (3) asking children open-ended, follow-up questions to gain insight into
the reasoning behind their ascriptions of “alive” and particular biological or psychological
properties to an object; and (4) asking children to generate a list of objects that are alive.
I employed a longitudinal design, the first extension to my previous methodology, to
examine the extent to which preschooler’s living kinds conceptualization undergoes
organizational restructuring during the preschool period. The second extension to my
methodology involved the addition of psychological property questions asked in Phase 2. In my
previous study, I limited the questions asked in Phase 2 to specifically focus on biological
properties that all living kinds engage in, such as growing and needing water and food.
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Psychological properties such as thinking, feeling and remembering are also important in
distinguishing living kinds from nonliving kinds although not all living kinds (i.e., plants) engage
in psychological properties. Jipson and Gelman’s (2007) work examined children’s ascription of
psychological properties to living and mobile nonliving kinds and found that preschoolers were
more likely to ascribe psychological properties to animals and animate objects than to inanimate
objects, but their work did not employ as broad a class set (i.e., they did not include plants) so
the question remains whether preschoolers are more likely to assign psychological properties to
mobile objects than to plants. The third extension to my previous methodology involved my
asking a random subset of the preschooler sample open-ended, follow-up questions in Phases 2
and 3. In my previous work (Margett & Witherington, 2011) the questions I asked elicited only
“yes” or “no” answers from the preschoolers; thus the results obtained neglected the rationale
behind children’s answers. In the current study I asked a subset of children an additional six
open-ended, follow-up questions in Phase 2 in order to gain insight into the reasoning behind
their ascription of certain biological or psychological properties to objects. Furthermore, in
Phase 3, I asked an additional open-ended, follow-up question to gain insight into preschoolers’
reasoning behind their ascription of “alive” to objects. The fourth and final extension to my
previous methodology involved my asking each child in the subset of children who received
additional open-ended questions, to generate a list of objects that are alive. Previous research
(e.g., Carey, 1985; Meunier & Cordier, 2004; Richards & Siegler, 1984) has shown that when
young children are asked to name things that are alive or asked to judge an object as alive, they
often name and judge animals as living but seldom name or judge plants as living. In the current
study, I examined if and how the type (e.g., humans, animals, plants, mobile or immobile
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objects) and number of objects listed as alive by preschoolers changed across the four testing
sessions.
The current research project, unlike previous studies, employed a longitudinal design
with a broad class set and multiple indices of understanding in order to maximize the likelihood
of obtaining results that bear directly on the nature of the developmental change that occurs in
preschoolers’ living kinds conceptualization during a period of development that has been
reliably identified as involving major changes in cognitive reasoning. Is preschooler’s living
kinds conceptualization, from roughly 3.5- to 4.5-years-old, best characterized as a process of
organizational restructuring along the lines that Piaget (1929) and Carey (1985) have described
or as a process of skill refinement and extension of application along the lines articulated Keil
(1994; Keil et al., 1999) and others (e.g., Greif et al., 2006; Inagaki & Hatano, 2002; Waxman,
2005). Thus, the objective of the current study was to examine how preschooler’s living kinds
concept is structured, and to what extent this structural organization undergoes transformative
change during the preschool period.
Methods
Participants
Thirty-five preschoolers between the ages of 3 and 4 years (16 female, 19 male)
participated in a total of four testing sessions over the course of approximately one year.
Recruited from two local preschools, preschoolers on average were 3 years, 4 months (SD = 2.73
mo) and 3 years, 7 months (SD = 2.77 mo) at their first and second testing sessions, respectively;
at their third and fourth testing sessions, preschoolers were 4 years, 0 months (SD = 2.93 mo)
and 4 years, 4 months (SD = 3 mo), respectively. A three month interval elapsed between
Testing Sessions 1 and 2 and between Testing Sessions 3 and 4, with a six month interval
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elapsing between Testing Sessions 2 and 3, for all preschoolers. Demographic breakdown for
this sample at Testing Session 1 was as follows: ethnicity: 54.3% Caucasian, 14.3% Hispanic,
22.9% White/Hispanic, 2.9% other; parent’s education level: 2.9% high school, 14.3%
Bachelor’s, 40% Masters, 40% Doctorate; parent’s income: 8.6% 20-50K, 31.4% 50-80K, 57.1%
greater than 80k.
An adult comparison sample (M = 27.22 years, SD = 10. 45 months) consisted of 36
undergraduates (21 female, 15 male) recruited from undergraduate psychology classes at the
University of New Mexico. Ethnicity breakdown for this sample was as follows: 41.7%
Caucasian, 30.6% Hispanic, 2.8% White/Hispanic, 25% Other.
Materials
Stimuli. I used the same twenty-eight test objects for each of the four testing sessions.
These test objects consisted of four classes of object: animals (e.g., klipspringer, bearded dragon,
vulture, etc.), plants (e.g., succulent plant, venus fly trap, cactus, etc.), immobile objects (e.g.,
hand operated egg beater, antique tools, wooden garlic press, etc.) and mobile objects (e.g.,
mechanized toys, Newton’s cradle, etc.). I employed a total of seven objects per class at each
testing session: four objects per class in phase 1 (see Figure 2) and the same three objects per
class in both phases 2 and 3 (see Figure 3). Test objects consisted of 4-second, real-time video
clips displays on a laptop computer. Video displays of both the animal and mobile artifact
classes involved motion, with actions such as chewing or walking for animals and spinning,
gyrating or rolling for mobile objects. Each mobile object’s motion appeared to be self-initiated
and sustained. Video displays of both the plant and immobile objects classes involved no
motion. I selected the mobile and immobile objects to be roughly equivalent in terms of number
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or parts, size, and material composition (metal, wood, plastic). All video displays featured the
test object against a plain background to eliminate the possible effect of contextual cues.
Procedure
For my preschool sample, children completed the same three testing phases, in the same
order, at each of the four testing sessions. Prior to the first testing session, each child’s parent or
guardian completed a demographic questionnaire. For each of the four testing sessions, a daycare
provider (or parent) escorted the preschooler to a conference room within the preschool where I
had set up a laptop. At the beginning of each session, I explained to the preschooler that she or
he was going to play a game and look at some neat things on the computer. I asked the child to
sit at the table, next to me, in front of the computer. Every testing session over the course of the
year consisted of the same 3-phase plan of administration, as follows.
Phase 1. Phase 1 specifically focused on statements and questions that preschoolers
generated about the four classes of objects. Consistent with my previous methodology (Margett
& Witherington, 2011), I began each session by introducing a hand puppet, for example a dog
puppet named Charlie. I told the preschooler that Charlie had lived for a long time in a doghouse
and now would like to know about things found in the world. I then told the child that there
were some new things for her or him to see on the computer and that her or his job was to tell the
puppet everything that she or he could about the things she or he saw in order to help the puppet
learn about those things. I started a computer program that displayed a matrix of boxes with a
black question mark in the middle of each and encouraged the child to pick any box. Once
chosen (by clicking on the black question mark), each box presented a full screen display of a
test object. After the 4 second video clip, the image of the object remained on the screen while I
exclaimed, “Wow! That is interesting. What can you tell Charlie about that thing?” I encouraged
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the child to tell the puppet about the object. Then I clicked on the box to reduce it back to the
matrix, marked the box to prevent it from being re-selected, and encouraged the child to choose
another box. This procedure continued until all 16 objects were displayed and the preschooler
had been given the opportunity to make statements about each item. For each testing session, I
used a different puppet (4 total) in order to keep the context of the testing session new and to
provide a different character with whom the child could interact and help teach.
Phase 2. Phase 2 specifically investigated what biological and psychological properties
preschoolers attributed to the four classes of objects by examining their responses to questions
asked about twelve objects (three from each class). I told the preschooler that now the puppet
was going to ask her or him questions about the objects that she or he was about to view. As in
Phase 1, I started the program and the child chose a box to display a test object. After the video
clip finished, a still-frame of the test object remained on the screen while I asked the child three
biological questions—“Does this one need water?" "Does this one grow?" "Does this one need
food?"—and three psychological questions—“Can this one feel happy?” “Does this one
remember yesterday?” “Does this one think thoughts?”—to which the child answered “yes” or
“no.” I asked these questions in random order for each test object at each testing session. The
procedure continued until all 12 objects were displayed and the preschooler had been given the
opportunity to answer all questions about each item.
Phase 3. Phase 3 investigated preschoolers’ classification of test objects as living or
nonliving and consisted of the same twelve objects as in Phase 2 (three of each class). I asked
the preschooler to tell the puppet if the things that she or he was about to see were alive or not
alive. I started the program in one of two randomized orders and clicked on a box to view the
four-second video clip that ended in a still frame. I then asked the preschooler, “Is this one
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alive?” to which the preschooler should respond “yes” or “no”. The procedure continued until
all 12 objects were displayed.
Qualitative condition. I randomly assigned a subset of 10 preschoolers to an additional
qualitative questioning condition. At each of the four testing sessions I asked each of these
children eight open-ended, follow-up questions (six after Phase 2 and two after Phase 3). After
Phase 2, I asked the following questions in a random order across children and testing sessions:
“How do you know something needs water?” “How do you know something can grow?” “How
do you know something needs food?” “How do you know something can feel happy?” “How do
you know something can remember yesterday?” How do you know something can think
thoughts?” The child could respond as much or as little as she or he chose during this
questioning session. After Phase 3, I asked, “How do you know something is alive?” and “Can
you tell me and (puppet’s name) some things that are alive?” I encouraged each child to list as
many things that are alive as she or he could in order to teach the puppet about things in the
world.
The adult sample encountered the same stimuli and game displays and completed all
three phases, just like the preschool sample. The adult procedure differed, however, from the
preschool procedure in that (1) there was no puppet and accompanying story line, (2) adults
completed only one testing session, (3) adults were tested in groups of 1-10 and were
administered a paper-and-pencil version of the testing procedure, and (4) all of the adults
answered the qualitative questions. Table 1 presents a summary of the procedures including
stimuli presented, questions asked and the type of responses generated by participants.
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Data Reduction and Transformation
Phase 1: Coding of Statements
Consistent with my previous coding procedures (Margett & Witherington, 2011), I had
all statements that preschoolers made in Phase 1, at each the four testing sessions, coded into one
of three general categories: (1) Biological type statements, comprised of both biological category
membership statements (e.g., “It’s a cow.”) and biological statements (e.g., “It has ears.”); (2)
Functional type statements, comprised of both functional category membership statements (e.g.,
“It’s a mixer.”) and functional statements (e.g., “It’s for chopping.”); and (3) Other type
statements, comprised of both ambiguous statements that can be applied appropriately to either
living or nonliving objects (e.g., “It’s moving.”) and non-informative statements that do not
readily indicate how a preschooler conceptualized the object (e.g., “It is black.”). Table 2
presents the number of biological and functional statements made for each object class at each
testing session.
Four trained research assistants blind to the hypotheses of the study transcribed and
coded video recordings of all testing sessions. I extensively trained one research assistant in the
coding procedures and had this research assistant complete a coding test made up of exemplar
statements preschoolers might make during a testing session. The research assistant accurately
coded 97% of the statements and, as an expert coder, checked all codes assigned by the other
three research assistants. When disagreements arose, the research assistants met to discuss and
come to an agreement on what code best characterized the statement.
Phases 2 and 3: Data Transformation
Missing data. I encountered two types of missing data. The first type of missing data
was due to preschoolers missing an entire testing session. Two preschoolers each missed two
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testing sessions, and three preschoolers each missed one testing session. One preschooler elected
not to participate in a testing session, and all other missed sessions were due to preschoolers no
longer being enrolled in a participating preschool. This resulted in a total of 5% of data being
missed. The second type of missing data was due to preschoolers not answering all of the yes/no
questions within a testing session. For those sessions where the preschooler participated, 1.9%
of the yes/no data were missing. Of this type of missing data, half were due to occasional
computer malfunction or experimenter error and half were due to preschoolers not wanting to
answer the question(s) or asking to move on.
The analytic procedures I used (difference matrices) required that I have complete data
on the Phase 2 and 3 yes/no responses. Therefore, when data were missing due to a preschooler
not completing an entire testing session, I imputed the missing data using the SPSS Multiple
Imputation function (version 17).1 When data were missing due to a preschooler missing an
entire testing session, I did not impute the missing data.
Preschoolers’ response patterns. My aim was to characterize each preschooler’s yes/no
response pattern, at each testing session, in order to get a sense of how she or he was treating the
stimulus exemplars in relation to one another. For example, were a preschooler’s response
patterns for the animal and plant stimulus exemplars similar? Did the preschooler distinguish the
animal and plant stimulus exemplars from the mobile and immobile object exemplars? Or did
the preschooler employ similar response patterns for the stimulus exemplars depicted in motion
1

Fully conditional specification (an iterative Markov chain Monte Carlo method) with 10
iterations was used. The imputation model included the preschooler’s ID number, the testing
session, the stimulus number, whether or not the stimulus was mobile, whether or not the
stimulus was alive (as predictors only), and all seven of the Phase 2 and 3 yes/no questions (as
predictors and imputed variables). All of the variables in the model were nominal scale, and I
used logistic regression models to impute the yes/no responses. I averaged eight imputations and
then rounded to either 0 or 1.
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(animals and mobile objects)? Did the preschooler distinguish the stimulus exemplars depicted
in motion from those depicted as immobile (plants and immobile objects)?
In order to characterize the pattern of preschoolers’ yes/no responses, I employed
difference matrices and created three distinct difference matrices for each preschooler at each
testing session, one based on her or his answers to the three biological property questions, one
based on her or his answers to the three psychological property questions, and a third based on
her or his answers to the alive question. To construct a difference matrix, I counted the number
of questions that were answered differently for all possible pairs of exemplars. Thus, a
difference score with respect to any given pair of exemplars for the three biological questions or
for the three psychological questions could range from 0 (all questions answered the same) to 3
(all questions answered differently). The range was 0 to 1 for the alive question for a pair of
stimulus exemplars. For illustration purposes, Figure 4 presents a sample preschooler’s
biological processes matrix. The preschooler responded “yes” to the three biological properties
for both the animal 1 exemplar and the animal 2 exemplar; therefore, the preschooler’s
difference (or dissimilarity) score for the animal 1-animal 2 pair is 0 (see Figure 4, row 1,
column 2). The preschooler responded “yes” to the three biological properties for the animal 1
exemplar but answered “no” to one of the three biological properties for the animal 3 exemplar;
thus, the preschooler’s difference score for animal 1-animal 3 pair is 1 (see Figure 4, row 1,
column 3). Had the preschooler answered “no” to two of the three biological property questions
for the animal 3 exemplar and “yes” to the three biological property questions for the animal
1exemplar, the difference score would be 2. Had the preschooler answered “no” to all three of
the biological property questions for the animal 3 exemplar and “yes” to the three biological
property questions for the animal 1 exemplar, the difference score would be 3.
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Adults’ response patterns. I also employed difference matrices with my adult data to
characterize how the group of 36 adults treated the stimulus exemplars in relation to one another.
I created three distinct difference matrices on the average of the adults’ response patterns, one
based on the average answers to the three biological property questions, one based on the
average answers to the three psychological property questions, and a third based on the average
answer to the alive question. Though I created the adults’ difference matrices similarly to the
preschoolers’, the adults’ answers were averaged together before differences were calculated so
the values in the matrices are not necessarily whole numbers. Figure 5 shows the adults’
biological property difference matrix.
Preschooler’s response patterns in relation to adults’ response pattern. To
characterize the difference between each preschooler’s pattern of yes/no responses, at each
testing session, and the adults’ average pattern of yes/no responses, I calculated the absolute
difference between each preschooler’s three difference matrices and the three adult matrices to
derive a between-sample (preschooler, adult) matrix difference for biological properties, for
psychological properties, and for alive understanding The resulting between-sample matrices
differences provide an index of how adult-like a preschooler’s conceptualization of the
relationships between the exemplars was at each testing session, based on the different types of
questions asked (biological, psychological, and alive). For example, the preschooler in Figure 4
had a difference score of 0 for the animal 1–animal 2 exemplar pair on the biological property
questions at Testing Session 1, and the adults’ average difference score for the same animal pair
was 0.002 (see Figure 5). Thus, the absolute difference of the preschooler’s difference score
from the adult difference score for that pair would be 0.002. A score of 0 indicates that the
preschooler treated the stimulus exemplars in relation to one another similarly to how adults
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treated the exemplars in relation to one another. Note that if the preschooler had said no to all
three biological property questions for both animal 1 and animal 2 exemplars, that preschooler
would still have an exemplar pair difference score of 0 and a between sample absolute difference
score from adults’ response pattern of 0.002 for that pair.
Once I had calculated the absolute difference between each preschooler’s difference
matrices and the adults’ matrices across all exemplar pairs (see Figure 6 for an example), I then
summed the absolute difference scores to derive a single score. In Figure 6, summing the
absolute difference of the sample preschooler’s biological difference matrix from the adults’
biological difference matrix was 37.97.
Preschooler’s’ response patterns in relation to hypothetical models. Preschoolers’
response patterns may differ qualitatively from adults’ response patterns; therefore, consideration
of alternative models for characterizing preschooler thought is required. In order to capture
potential qualitative differences in preschoolers thinking, I created three hypothetical models to
compare preschoolers’ response patterns against. The first hypothetical model is the Mobile
Model which contrasts mobile objects (animals and mobiles) with immobile objects (plants and
immobile objects) and characterizes mobile—but not immobile—objects as engaging in the three
biological processes, the three psychological processes, and as being alive. I designed the
Mobile Model to represent a framework of understanding based on the presence and absence of
motion. The second hypothetical model is the Animal Model which contrasts animals with the
other three classes of objects (plants, mobile objects, and immobile objects) and characterizes
only animals as engaging in biological and psychological processes and as being alive. I
designed the Animal Model to represent a framework of understanding based on the idea that
animals are biological, psychological, and alive but the other classes of objects (plants, mobile,
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and immobile objects) are not. The third hypothetical model is the Immobile Object Model
which contrasts the immobile class of objects with the other three classes of objects (animals,
plants, and mobiles) and characterizes immobile objects as the only class of objects not engaging
in biological or psychological processes and not being alive. I designed this model to represent a
framework of understanding based on the idea that immobile objects are not biological,
psychological, or alive but the other three classes are. This third model represents a confusion
based on motion: the presence of motion by the mobile objects makes them engage in biological
and psychological processes as well as be alive. However, the absence of motion by the plants
does not prohibit them from engaging in biological and psychological processes or being alive.
Note that the hypothetical models are not orthogonal to each other and their degree of similarity
is dependent on which questions are being asked (biological, psychological or alive). Thus, a
change in preschoolers’ pattern of responses that brings them closer to one model may also bring
them closer to another model.
I created difference matrices for each of my hypothetical models based on how one
would answer the yes/no questions if one held each of the three conceptual frameworks in mind.
Again I made three distinct difference matrices for each model, one for the three biological
questions, one for the three psychological questions, and one for the alive question. Then, I
calculated the difference between each preschooler’s matrix and each of the hypothetical model
matrices the same way I calculated their difference from the adults’ average response pattern.
Figures 7 through 9 present the biological property difference matrix for the Mobile Model,
Animal Model, and Immobile Object Model, respectively.
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Data Analysis Strategy
The major purpose of my analyses was to examine how preschoolers’ living kinds
concept is structured across time and to what extent this structural organization undergoes
transformative changes during the preschool period. To accomplish this, I employed two
primary statistical techniques: hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) and paired sample t-tests.
Given the nature of my data structure—testing sessions (Level 1) were nested within the
contextual variable of preschooler (Level 2)—HLM allowed me to account for the nonindependence of testing sessions within preschoolers. I employed HLM techniques (via SPSS
version 21) to estimate models with linear slopes. I was primarily interested in looking at fixed
effects, though I included the effect of random intercepts in the models. Including random
intercepts in the models employed allowed for the examination of whether preschoolers start out
with different levels of understanding on my outcome measures. I was unable to look at the
effect of random slopes due to failures to converge with this parameter included; therefore, the
models employed assumed that the rate of change across preschoolers was the same – an
assumption that is undoubtedly false. Paired sample t-tests provided a way to examine how
preschoolers treated the four classes of objects in relation to each other at each testing session.
When all pairwise t-tests were conducted, I corrected for familywise Type I error through
Dunn’s test at a familywise alpha of .05 (see Howell, 1987).
Given my interest in examining preschoolers’ conceptualization of the biological and
psychological domains of understanding independently and in relation to one another, and in
examining how this conceptualization changed over the course of the year-long study, the
dependent variables I assessed were preschooler’s response patterns to biological and
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psychological property questions as well as the alive question at each testing session, and how
they compared to adults’ response pattern and to response patterns based on hypothetical models
that preschoolers may employ when asked to reason about living and nonliving kinds (in the
form of the difference matrices described above).
In addition to examining preschoolers’ response patterns at each testing phase and at each
testing session, I was also interested in examining whether preschoolers’ response patterns in one
phase or in one domain of understanding (biological or psychological) mapped onto responding
in another phase or domain of understanding. If preschoolers’ responding within a particular
phase or domain of understanding mapped onto responding in another phase or domain of
understanding, this would demonstrate that a degree of structural organization exists in
preschooler’s living kinds concept. Thus, to further investigate the structural organization of
preschoolers’ living kinds concept and how it developed over the course of the year-long study, I
used HLM to determine whether responding in one phase or domain of understanding predicted
responding in other phases or domain of understanding.
Results
Phase 1: Statements Generated
Preliminary HLM analyses revealed no significant association between the number of
statements generated in Phase 1 and preschoolers’ gender, t(28.034) = 1.496, p = .146, 95% CI [1.962, 12.596]; ethnicity, t(27.949) = -.754, p =.457, 95% CI [-9.593, 4.430]; parental education,
t(27.476) = -.266, p = .793, 95% CI [-10.999, 8.476] or income, t(27.425) = -.243, p = .810, 95%
CI [-15.309, 12.065]. Preschoolers’ intercepts significantly varied when all of these predictor
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variables were centered at zero (female, minority, graduate degree and high income)2, Wald Z =
2.765, p = .003, var = 70.116. Consequently, I eliminated these variables from further Phase 1
analyses.
Statement quantities. HLM analyses revealed that preschoolers significantly increased
the number of statements they made for each class over the course of the year they were studied,
with preschoolers significantly varying on the number of statements made when age was
centered at the mean age (M = 3 years, 9 months, SD = 5 months). Specifically, as preschoolers
got older, they increased the number of statements made for the animal class, t(116.394) = 3.280,
p = .001, b = .009; for the plant class, t(121.593) = 3.794, p < .001, b = .005; for the mobile
class, t(120.209) = 3.137, p = .002, b = .004; and for the immobile class, t(122.348) = 2.630, p =
.010, b = .004 (see Table 3 for means and standard deviations). The number of statements that
preschoolers made for each of these classes ranged from 0 to 39 for the animal class, 0 to 17 for
the plant class, 0 to15 for the mobile class, and 0 to15 for the immobile class, and the slopes of
.009, .005, .004, and .004 in the above analyses indicate that on average, the preschoolers in this
study increased the number of statements made for each respective class by 3.285, 1.825, 1.46,
and 1.46 over one year. In addition, preschoolers’ intercepts significantly varied for each class:
for animals, Wald Z = 2.954, p = .002, var = 14.553, indicating that the standard deviation of
preschoolers’ intercepts at the mean age was 3.815; for plants, Wald Z = 2.491, p = .06, var =
1.884, indicating that the standard deviation of preschoolers’ intercepts at the mean age was
1.373; for mobiles Wald Z = 2.607, p = .005, var = 2.534, indicating that the standard deviation
of preschoolers’ intercepts at the mean age was 1.592; and for immobiles, Wald Z = 2.365, p =
2

All demographics were dichotomized as follows: gender was coded as 1 = male, 0 = female;
ethnicity was codes as 1 = white, 0 = other; education 1 = High School/Bachelors, 0 =
Masters/PhD; income 1 = < 50,000, 0= greater than 50,000.
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.009, var = 2.449, indicating that the standard deviation of preschoolers’ intercepts at the mean
age was 1.565.
In addition to increasing the number of statements they made for each class with age,
preschoolers also made significantly more statements in response to the animal class than to any
other class, irrespective of testing session (see Table 3 for means and standard deviations).
Specifically, paired sample t-tests revealed more statements made for the animal class relative to
the plant, mobile and immobile classes respectively at Testing Session 1, all ts > 3.42, all ps <
.003; at Testing Session 2, all ts > 4.018, all ps < .001; at Testing Session 3, all ts > 4.38, all ps <
.001; and at Testing Session 4, all ts > 4.31, all ps < .001 (see Table 4 for full test statistics).
Preschoolers also made more statements about the plant class than the mobile class of objects at
Testing Session 2, t(34) = 3.106, p = .004, and Testing Session 4, t(30) = 3.344, p = .002.
However, there were no significant differences in the number of statements preschoolers made
for the plant class and the immobile class at any of the four testing sessions. In addition, there
were no significant differences in the number of statements preschoolers made in response to the
mobile and immobile class of objects at any of the four testing sessions.
Statement qualities. With respect to the type of statements made, preschoolers
generated significantly more biological statements than functional statements across all four
testing sessions (see Table 5 for means and standard deviations): at Testing Session 1, t(34) =
6.632, p < .001; at Testing Session 2, t(34) = 7.104, p < .001; at Testing Session 3, t(31) = 8.895,
p < .001; and at Testing Session 4, t(30) = 8.672, p < .001. The nature of the statements that the
preschoolers made in response to the animal, plant and immobile classes were consistently of the
“correct” type: biological statements for animal and plant classes and functional statements for
immobile classes (see Table 3 for means and standard deviations). Specifically, paired sample t-
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tests revealed significantly more biological statements than functional statements across all four
testing sessions for the animal class, all ts > 6.99, all ps < .001, and for the plant class, all t’s >
10.11, all p’s < .001, and significantly more functional statements than biological statements
across all four testing sessions for the immobile class, all ts < -3.46, all ps < .002 (see Table 6
for full test statistics).
However, preschoolers in the sample were less clear on what type of statement to make
for the mobile class. Although there was a significant difference in the type of statements (more
functional than biological) preschoolers made in response to the mobile class at Testing Session
3, t(31) = -4.153, p < .001, no significant differences emerged at Testing Session 1, t(34) = 1.968, p = .057, at Testing Session 2, t(34) = -1.462, p = .153, or at Testing Session 4, t(30) = .523, p =.605.
Phase 2: Biological Process Questions
Preliminary HLM analyses revealed no significant association between a more adult-like
response pattern to the biological property questions in Phase 2 and preschoolers’ gender,
t(28.544) = -.702, p = .488, 95% CI [-13.966, 6.831]; ethnicity, t(28.418) = -.827, p =.415, 95%
CI [-14.057, 5.966]; parental education, t(27.713) = .477, p = .637, 95% CI [-10.640, 17.100] or
income, t(27.636) = -1.113, p = .275, 95% CI [-30.073, 8.907]. Preschoolers’ intercepts
significantly varied when all of these predictor variables were centered at zero (female, minority,
graduate degree and high income), Wald Z = 2.089, p = .018, var = 665. Consequently, I
eliminated these variables from further Phase 2 Biological analyses.
Model comparisons for biological response patterns. To characterize how
preschoolers’ response pattern to the three biological property questions changed in relation to
adults’ response pattern (the “adult model”) over the course of the year-long study, I employed
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HLM analysis (see Table 7 for all means and standard deviations). Results revealed that over
one year, preschoolers’ response pattern linearly moved significantly closer to the adult model,
t(118.865) = -5.917, p <.001, b = -.054. Given the structure of the adults’ biological difference
matrix, the potential minimum that a preschooler’s biological difference matrix could differ from
the adult model was 12.38, with a potential maximum difference from the adult model of 107.91,
resulting in a range of 95.53. The model indicates that, on average, preschoolers in this study
moved 19.71 units closer to the adult model over the course of one year, approximately 21% of
the potential range. In addition, preschoolers’ intercepts significantly varied in regard to how
similar preschoolers’ response pattern was to the adult model when preschoolers’ response
pattern was centered at the mean age, Wald Z = 2.733, p = .003, var = 126.084, indicating that
the standard deviation of preschoolers’ intercepts at the mean age was 11.23 units.
Although preschoolers’ biological responding moved significantly closer to the adult
model as they got older, was their responding significantly different than chance responding at
each testing session? To answer this question, I created the hypothetical dissimilarity matrix that
would be expected if the preschoolers randomly answered “yes” or “no” to the biological
questions. For example, if the preschoolers randomly answered “yes” 50% of the time, then I
would expect an average of 1.5 different answers for each pair of objects over the three
biological questions. However, I did not want to assume that preschoolers necessarily said “yes”
50% of the time, so to account for any bias they may have had in word preference, I calculated
the expected number of differences from the actual proportion of “yes” answers the preschooler
gave for each question. Then, I calculated the difference between this “chance answering”
dissimilarity matrix and the adults’ dissimilarity matrix to get a comparison value that was on the
same scale as my similarity to adults’ biological processes outcome variable. The expected
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difference from the adult matrix for a preschooler whose response pattern was random in this
way was 86.4. An average difference that is smaller than 86.4 indicates that the preschoolers
were more similar to adults than chance (see Table 7 for the absolute difference between
preschoolers’ and the adult models biological responding, means and standard deviations).
Results revealed that at Testing Sessions 1 and 2, the difference between preschoolers’ response
patterns and the adult model was not significantly different than chance, TS1, t(34) = -.484, p =
.632, 95% CI [-5.550, 3.426]; TS2, t(34) = -1.274, p = .211, 95% CI [-7.081, 1.623]. However,
at Testing Sessions 3 and 4, preschoolers’ response patterns were significantly closer to the adult
model than chance, TS3, t(31) = -2.815, p = .008, 95% CI [-21.512, -3.435]; TS4, t(30) = -5.225,
p < .001), 95% CI [-30.077, -13.172].
How did the other proposed hypothetical models fare in characterizing preschoolers’
response patterns across the four testing sessions? To answer this question, I took the absolute
difference of preschoolers’ response pattern to the three biological property questions at each
testing session relative to the adult model and to the three hypothetical models (see Table 7 for
means and standard deviations). All pairwise comparisons were conducted at each testing
session. At all four testing sessions, preschoolers’ responding was closer to the adult and animal
models than the mobile or immobile models so I focused on the adult and animal models (see
Figure 10 for Preschoolers’ biological response pattern in relation to the adult model and
hypothetical models). Paired sample t-tests revealed that at Testing Sessions 1 and 2, there was
no significant difference in preschoolers’ response patterns from the adult model and the animal
model TS1, t(34) = -1.291, p =.205, 95% CI [-8.190, 1.827]; TS2, t(34) = -1.607, p =.117, 95%
CI [-9.345, 1.091]. However, at Testing Sessions 3 and 4, preschoolers’ response patterns were
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significantly closer to the adult model than the animal model, TS3, t(31) = -3.276, p = .003, 95%
CI [-20.351, -4.733]; TS4, t(30) = -4.497, p < .001, 95% CI [-25.845, -9.701] (see Figure 10).
Thus, at the first two testing sessions, preschoolers’ yes/no response patterns to the three
biological questions could not be distinguished from guessing and the absolute difference of their
response pattern was equally similar to both the adult model and the hypothetical animal model.
However, at the final two testing sessions, preschoolers’ yes/no response patterns to the three
biological questions were significantly closer to the adult model than would be expected by
chance and their response patterns were significantly closer to the adult model than to any of the
hypothetical models.
Spatial representation of change in preschoolers’ biological response pattern. To
further investigate how preschoolers’ yes/no response patterns to the three biological processes
questions changed over the course of the study, I created Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) plots
to spatially represent how preschoolers and adults conceptualized the relationships between
exemplars of the different classes of objects. Specifically, I was interested in how the
preschoolers and adults grouped and distinguished the exemplars from one another. MDS is
typically used to determine the underlying structure of a set of objects based on proximities or
similarities. For example, given the distances in miles between pairs of US cities, MDS could be
used to plot those cities in two dimensions and would essentially produce a map of the US. The
two dimensions would then be interpretable as east-west and north-south. Unlike this example
however, most proximity, or similarity, data will contain “noise.” If A is 3 units away from B,
and B is 3 units away from C, but C is only 4 units away from A, then A, B, and C cannot be
plotted in one dimension without stress. MDS finds the solution that produces the lowest stress
for a given number of dimensions (For more details see Kruskal & Wish, 1978).
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I created scree plots based on stress to decide how many dimensions to use in order to
represent the exemplars. The number of dimensions that gave the best fit for the preschoolers
varied across ages and measures (biological vs. psychological questions). For the adults, onedimensional solutions had stress < 0.05 for all measures, which suggests that adult conceptions
were best represented in one dimension (Kruskal & Wish, 1978). In order to (a) have a
consistent format and (b) be able to compare the preschoolers to adults, I created all the plots in
one dimension.3 In this case, I did not use MDS to determine the true, underlying structure of
the preschoolers’ concept, but instead as a tool for creating a visual representation to see how
adults and preschoolers were grouping the exemplars based on their yes/no responses.
The first MDS plot represented how adults treated the stimulus exemplars in relation to
each other based on their yes/no responses to the three biological property questions. The adults’
MDS plot illustrates how adults largely formed two groupings, animal and plant stimulus
exemplars in one group and mobile and immobile stimulus exemplars in a separate group (see
Figure 11a). I decided to create two MDS plots on the preschoolers responses, one when the
preschoolers were younger (pre-median age split) and one when the preschoolers were older
(post-median age split) in order to visually examine how their response patterns changed with
age. Figure 11b and 11c represent how the preschoolers treated the stimulus exemplars in
relation to each other, when the preschoolers were younger and when the preschoolers were
older, respectively.
The MDS plots helps to illustrate the change in preschooler response pattern to the three
biological questions over time. At earlier ages, preschoolers evidenced a fair deal of spread

3

MDS settings and specifications: Euclidian squared distance matrix; levels of measurement =
ratio; conditionality = matrix; dimensions =1; S stress convergence = .001; minimum stress value
= .005; minimum iterations = 30.
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between all the stimulus exemplars without distinct groupings. However, even at earlier ages
preschoolers were broadly distinguishing living things from nonliving things, with objects
(mobile and immobile exemplars) on one end and living kinds (plants and animal exemplars) on
the other end (see Figure 11b). While the exemplars were fairly evenly distributed along the
dimension, mobile objects came first, followed by immobile, then by animals, and finally by
plants with no overlap between the classes. With age preschoolers in this study evidenced
increased grouping of the exemplars with living kinds grouped distinct from objects (see
Figure11c). The increased tightening of the living and nonliving groups can be characterized by
the immobile objects moving closer to the mobile objects and the animals moving closer to the
plants.
Phase 2: Psychological Process Questions
Preliminary HLM analyses revealed no significant association between a more adult-like
response pattern to the psychological property questions in Phase 2 and preschoolers’ gender,
t(27.590) = .188, p =.852, 95% CI [-8.567, 10.299]; ethnicity, t(27.493) = -.777, p = .444, 95%
CI [-12.528, 5.641]; parental education, t(26.957) = -.109, p = .914, 95% CI [-13.276, 11.940] or
income, t(26.899) = -.188, p = .852, 95% CI [-19.344, 16.096]. Preschoolers’ intercepts
significantly varied when all of these predictor variables were centered at zero (female, minority,
graduate degree and high income), Wald Z = 2.547, p = .005, var = 109.652. Consequently, I
eliminated these variables from further Phase 2 Psychological analyses.
Model comparisons for psychological response patterns. To characterize how
preschoolers’ response pattern to the three psychological property questions changed in relation
to the adult model over the course of the year-long study, I employed HLM analysis (see Table 8
for the absolute difference between preschoolers’ and the adult models psychological
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responding, means and standard deviations). Results revealed that over one year, preschoolers’
response pattern did not move significantly closer to the adult model, t(119.932) = -.606, p =
.545, b = -.005. Given the structure of the adults’ psychological difference matrix, the potential
minimum that a preschooler’s psychological difference matrix could differ from the adult model
was 8.85, with a potential maximum difference from the adult model of 105.99, resulting in a
range of 97.14. Although non-significant, the model indicates that, on average, preschoolers in
this study moved 1.825 units closer to the adult model over the course of one year,
approximately 2%. In addition, preschoolers’ intercepts significantly varied in regard to how
similar preschoolers’ response pattern was to the adult model when preschoolers’ response
pattern was centered at the mean age, Wald Z = 2.508, p = .006, var = 85.494, indicating that the
standard deviation of preschoolers’ intercepts at the mean age was 9.25 units.
Although preschoolers’ psychological responding did not move significantly closer to the
adult model as they got older, was their responding significantly different than chance
responding at each testing session? To answer this question, I used the same process described
in the biological property questions section and found that the expected difference from the adult
model measured from chance was 74.67 over the three psychological processes questions. At all
testing sessions, preschoolers’ response patterns were significantly closer to the adult model than
chance, TS1, t(34) = -2.863, p = .007, 95% CI [-12.336, -2.093]; TS2, t(34) = -5.568, p < .001,
95% CI [-17.148, -7.977]; TS3, t(31) = -3.981, p < .001, 95% CI [-19.080, -6.152]; TS4, t(30) =
-2.567, p = .015, 95% CI [-16.056, =1.827].
How did the other proposed hypothetical models fare in characterizing preschoolers’
response patterns across the four testing sessions? To answer this question, I took the absolute
difference of preschoolers’ response pattern to the three psychological property questions at each
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testing session relative to the adult model and to the three hypothetical models (see Figure 12).
All pairwise comparisons were conducted at each testing session. Paired sample t-tests revealed
that at each testing session preschoolers’ response patterns were significantly closer to the adult
model than to any of the hypothetical models (see Table 8 for means, standard deviations and
significant differences between models).
Spatial representation of change in preschoolers’ psychological response pattern.
Although there was not a significant change in the degree of similarity between preschoolers’
psychological responding and the adult model over the course of the study, I visually examined
preschoolers’ organization compared to adults’ organization at pre and post median age split via
MDS plots to confirm that no reorganization had taken place in preschoolers’ psychological
responding. Figure 13a represented how adults’ treated the stimulus exemplars in relation to
each other based on their yes/no responses to the three psychological property questions. The
adults’ MDS plot illustrates how adults largely formed two groupings, animal stimulus
exemplars in one group, and plant, mobile and immobile stimulus exemplars in a separate group.
Figures 13, plots b and c, represent how the preschool sample treated the stimulus exemplars in
relation to each other when the preschoolers were younger (pre-median age split) and when they
were older (post-median age split), respectively.
The MDS plot helps to illustrate the change in preschoolers’ response pattern to the three
psychological questions over time. At the earlier ages preschoolers evidenced a fair deal of
spread between the all stimulus exemplars yet broadly distinguished living things from nonliving
things with the nonliving exemplars at one end and living kind exemplars (plants and animals)
on the other (see Figure 13b). With increased age, there was still no overlap between living and
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nonliving things, though preschoolers appeared to shift the plant exemplars closer to the
nonliving kinds (see Figure 13c).
Within Phase Analyses: Phase 2 Biological Property Questions with Phase 2 Psychological
Property Questions
To investigate the relation between a more adult-like response pattern to the biological
property questions in Phase 2 and a more adult-like response pattern to the psychological
property questions in Phase 2, I employed HLM analyses. These analyses targeted the following
question: Did preschoolers who responded in more adult-like fashion to the biological questions
in Phase 2 also respond in more adult-like fashion to the psychological questions in Phase 2?
Results revealed that a more adult-like response pattern to the three biological property questions
in Phase 2 predicted a significantly less adult-like response pattern to the three psychological
property questions in Phase 2, t(130.920) = 3.452, p < .001, b = .227. The slope of .227
indicates that, on average, for each unit that, on preschoolers’ biological difference matrix
became more similar to adults’ biological difference matrix, there is a .277 unit (out of the
possible 97.14 range) decrease in the similarity of preschooler’s psychological difference matrix
to the adults’ psychological difference matrix. In this model, intercepts of the psychological
response pattern significantly varied across preschoolers when the biological response pattern
was centered at the mean, Wald Z = 2.255, p = .012, var = 64.854.
Phase 3: Alive Question
Preliminary HLM analyses revealed no significant association between a more adult-like
response pattern to the alive question in Phase 3 and preschoolers’ gender, t(28.520) = .537, p =
.595, 95% CI [-2.386, 4.084]; ethnicity, t(28.412) = -.544, p = .590, 95% CI [-3.943, 2.287];
parental education, t(27.811) = .238, p = .813, 95% CI [-3.818, 4.823] and income, t(27.745) = -
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1.207, p = .238, 95% CI [-9.648, 2.497]. Preschoolers’ intercepts significantly varied when all
of these predictor variables were centered at zero (female, minority, graduate degree and high
income), Wald Z = 2.435, p = .007, Var = 12.170. Consequently, I eliminated these variables
from further Phase 3 alive analyses.
Model comparisons for alive response patterns. To characterize how preschoolers’
response pattern to the alive questions changed in relation to the adult model over the course of
the year-long study, I employed HLM analyses (see Table 9 for the absolute difference between
preschoolers’ and the adult models alive responding, means and standard deviations). Results
revealed that over one year, preschoolers’ response pattern linearly moved significantly closer to
the adult model, t(121.494) = -4.699, p < .001, b = -.013. Given the structure of the adults’ alive
difference matrix, the potential minimum that a preschooler’s alive difference matrix could differ
from the adult model was 2.29, with a potential maximum difference from the adult model of
36.99, resulting in a range of 34.7. The model indicates that, on average, preschoolers in this
study moved 4.745 units closer to the adult model over the course of one year, approximately
14%. In addition, preschoolers’ intercepts significantly varied in regard to how similar
preschoolers’ response pattern was to the adult model when the preschoolers’ response pattern
was centered at the mean age, Wald Z = 2.526, p =.006, var= 8.917, indicating that the standard
deviation of preschoolers’ intercepts at the mean age was 2.99 units.
Based on a plot of the absolute difference of preschoolers’ response patterns from adult
model (see Figure 14) I was concerned that the significant effect could be due to four outliers. I
re-ran the model without those four points, and without the preschoolers who contributed those
four points, and in both cases the linear effect was still significant.
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Although the preschoolers’ alive response patterns did move significantly closer to the
adult model as they got older, was their responding significantly different than chance
responding at each testing session? To answer this question, I used the same process described
in the biological questions section and I found that the expected difference from the adult model
from chance response pattern on the alive question is 30.5 (see Table 9 for the absolute
difference between preschoolers’ and the adult models alive responding, means and standard
deviations). At Testing Sessions 1 and 2, preschoolers’ response pattern is significantly further
from the adult model than chance responding, TS1, t(34) = 5.697, p < .001, 95% CI [1.571,
3.314]; TS2, t(34) = 5.024, p < .001, 95% CI [1.492, 3.519]. However, at Testing Sessions 3 and
4, preschoolers’ response pattern was not significantly different from the adult model than
chance, TS3, t(31) = .003, p = .997, 95% CI [-2.380, 2.388]; TS4, t(30) = -1.141, p = .263, 95%
CI [-4.973, 1.408].
How did the other proposed hypothetical models fare in characterizing preschoolers’
response patterns across the four testing sessions? To answer this question, I took the absolute
difference of preschoolers’ response pattern to the alive question at each testing session relative
to the adult model and the three hypothetical models (see Table 9 for means and standard
deviations). All pairwise comparisons were conducted at each testing session. Paired sample ttests revealed that at Testing Sessions 1 and 2, there was no significant difference in
preschoolers’ response patterns from the to the animal model and the immobile object model,
TS1, t(34)= <.001, p = 1.000, 95% CI [-3.763, 3.763]; TS2, t(34) = -.168, p = .868, 95% CI [3.750, 3.178]. However, at Testing Sessions 3 and 4, preschoolers’ response patterns was
significantly closest to the animal model, TS3, t(31)= 3.753, p = .001, 95% CI [3.839, 12.981];
TS4, t(30) = 2.501, p = .018 , 95% CI [ 1.208, 11.969] (see Figure 15).
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Thus, at the first two testing sessions, preschoolers yes/no response pattern to the alive
question was significantly further from the adult model than chance would predict and their
response pattern was equally similar to both hypothetical models, the animal model and
immobile object model. However, at the final two testing sessions, preschoolers yes/no response
patterns to the alive question was not significantly closer to adult model than chance and their
response patterns were significantly closer to the animal model than to the adult model or the
other hypothetical models.
Spatial representation of change in preschoolers’ alive response pattern. To further
investigate how preschoolers’ yes/no response patterns to the alive question changed over the
course of the study, I created MDS plots. Figure 16a represents how adults’ treated the stimulus
exemplars in relation to each other based on their yes/no responses to the alive question. The
adults’ MDS plot illustrates how adults largely form two groupings, animal and plant stimulus
exemplars in one group and mobile and immobile stimulus exemplars in a group distinct from
the animal and plant exemplars. Figure 16b and 16c represent how the preschooler sample
treated the stimulus exemplars in relation to each other when the preschoolers were younger
(pre-median age split) and when the preschoolers were older (post-median age split),
respectively.
The MDS plots help to illustrate the change in preschoolers’ response pattern to the alive
question over time. At the earlier ages preschoolers evidenced a fair deal of spread between all
the stimulus exemplars (see Figure 16b). A degree of overlap between the stimulus exemplars
was evident and immobile stimulus exemplars were at one end moving into the plant exemplars,
followed by the mobile exemplars, followed by the then animal exemplars. Thus, it appeared
that at earlier ages, preschoolers broadly distinguish the exemplars based on mobility with the
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immobile and plant exemplars treated more similarly relative to the mobile and animal
exemplars. With age preschoolers no longer broadly distinguish the exemplars based on
mobility but began to clearly treat the animal exemplars as separate from the other three classes
of object (see Figure 16c).
Across Phase Analyses
In addition to examining preschoolers’ response patterns at each phase and in each
domain of understanding, I was interested in examining whether preschoolers’ response patterns
in one phase or in one area of understanding mapped onto responding in another phase or domain
of understanding. If preschoolers’ responding within a particular phase mapped onto responding
in another phase, this would demonstrate some degree of structural organization in their living
kinds conceptualization. Such findings would indicate that a conceptual framework is in place in
the preschool period that can be applied by preschoolers when making statements about different
classes of objects and when they answer questions about biological and psychological processes
as well as attribute “alive” to different classes of objects. Thus, to more thoroughly investigate
the structural organization of preschoolers’ living kinds concept, I used HLM to determine
whether responding in one phase or one domain of understanding predicted responding in
another phase or domain of understanding.
Across Phase Analyses: Phase 1 Statements Generated with Phase 2 Biological Property
Questions
To investigate the relationship between the absolute count of “correct” type statements
made in Phase 1—biological statements for animal and plant classes and functional statements
for mobile and immobile classes—and a more adult-like response pattern to the biological
property questions in Phase 2, I employed HLM analyses. These analyses targeted the following
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questions: Did preschoolers who appropriately applied biological statements to the animal or
plant classes in Phase 1 also respond in more adult-like fashion to the biological processes
questions in Phase 2? Did preschoolers who appropriately applied functional statements to the
mobile or immobile classes in Phase 1 also respond in more adult-like fashion to the biological
questions in Phase 2? Results revealed that increases in the absolute count of biological type
statements made about the plant class in Phase 1 predicted a more adult-like response pattern to
the biological property questions in Phase 2, t(115.828) = -3.459, p = .001, b = -2.815. The
slope of -2.815 indicates that for each additional biological statement made for the plant class in
Phase 1, there was an average increase of 2.185 (out of the possible 95.53 range) units towards a
more adult-like response pattern to the biological property questions in Phase 2. No additional
associations were significant: biological statements for animals, t(125.547) = .431, p = 667, b =
.164; functional statements for mobiles, t(116.339) = -.596, p = .570, b = .-543; functional
statements for immobiles, t(127.208) = .511, p = .610, b = .4233. In this model, the biological
response pattern intercepts significantly varied across preschoolers when the number of correct
type statements was centered at the mean for each object class, Wald Z = 2.067, p = .019, var=
86.490.
Next, I looked at the relationship between “incorrect” type statements made in Phase 1—
biological statements for mobile and immobile classes and functional statements for animal and
plant classes—and a more adult-like response pattern to the biological property questions in
Phase 2. These analyses targeted the following questions: Did preschoolers who inappropriately
applied biological statements to the mobile or immobile classes in Phase 1 also respond in less
adult-like fashion to the biological processes questions in Phase 2? Did preschoolers who
inappropriately applied functional statements to the plant class in Phase 1 also respond in less
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adult-like fashion to the biological questions in Phase 2? HLM analyses revealed no significant
associations: functional statements for animals, t(111.467) = .424, p = .672; functional
statements for plants, t(118.711) = .561, p = .576; biological statements for mobiles, t(121.153)
= -.100, p = .920; biological statements for immobiles, t(127.924) = -488, p = .626. In this
model, the biological response pattern intercepts significantly varied across preschoolers when
the number of incorrect type statements was centered at the mean for each object class, Wald Z =
2.109, p =.018, var= 102.337.
Across Phase Analyses. Phase 1: Statements Generated with Phase 2: Psychological
Property Questions
To investigate the relationship between the absolute count of “correct” type statements
made in Phase 1—biological statement for animal and plant classes and functional statements for
mobile and immobile classes—and a more adult-like response pattern to the psychological
property questions in Phase 2, I employed HLM analyses. These analyses targeted the following
questions: Did preschoolers who appropriately applied biological statements to the animal or
plant classes in Phase 1 also respond in more adult-like fashion to the psychological processes
questions in Phase 2? Did preschoolers who appropriately applied functional statement to the
mobile or immobile classes in Phase 1 also respond in more adult-like fashion to the
psychological questions in Phase 2? Results revealed that an increase in the absolute count of
biological type statements made for the animal class in Phase 1 predicted a more adult-like
response patterns to the biological property questions in Phase 2, t(118.790) = -2.302, p .023, b =
-.688. The slope of -.688 indicates that for each additional biological statement made for the
animal class in Phase 1, there was an average increase of .688 (out of the possible 97.14 range)
units towards a more adult-like response pattern to the psychological property questions in Phase
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2. No additional associations were significant: biological statements for plants, t(108.524) = 1.110, p = .269; functional statements for mobile, t(108.913) = .304, p = .762; functional
statements for immobile t(121.676) = 1.023, p = .308. In this model, the psychological response
pattern intercepts significantly varied across preschoolers when the number of correct type
statements was centered at the mean for each object class, Wald Z = 2.672, p =.004, var =
99.376.
Next, I looked at the relationship between “incorrect” type statements made in Phase 1—
biological statements for mobile and immobile classes and functional statements for animal and
plant classes—and a more adult-like response pattern to the psychological property questions in
Phase 2. These analyses targeted the following questions: Did preschoolers who inappropriately
applied biological statements to the mobile or immobile classes in Phase 1 also respond in less
adult-like fashion to the psychological processes questions in Phase 2? Did preschoolers who
inappropriately applied functional statements to the animal or plant classes in Phase 1 also
respond in less adult-like fashion to the psychological questions in Phase 2? HLM analyses
revealed that an increase in the absolute count of functional type statements made for the animal
class in Phase 1 predicted less adult-like response pattern to the psychological property questions
in Phase 2, t(105.858) = 2.138, p =.035, b = 6.456. The slope of 6.456 indicates that for each
additional functional statement made for the animal class in Phase 1, there is an average decrease
of 6.456 (out of the possible 97.14 range) units towards a less adult-like response pattern to the
psychological property questions in Phase 2. No other significant associations emerged:
functional statements for plants, t(111.464) = -.853, p = .395; biological statements for mobiles,
t(113.468) = -1.463, p = .146; biological statements for immobiles, t(124.697) = -1.256, p =
.211. In this model, the psychological response pattern intercepts significantly varied across
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preschoolers when the number of incorrect type statements was centered at the mean for each
object class, Wald Z = 2.831, p = .002, var = 108.474.
Across Phase Analyses. Phase 1: Statements Generated with Phase 3: Alive Question
To investigate the relationship between the absolute count of “correct” type statements
made in Phase 1—biological statements for animal and plant classes and functional statements
for mobile and immobile classes—and a more adult-like response pattern to the alive question in
Phase 3, I employed HLM analyses. These analyses targeted the following questions: Did
preschoolers who appropriately applied biological statements to the animal or plant classes in
Phase 1 also respond in more adult-like fashion to the alive question in Phase 3? Did
preschoolers who appropriately applied functional statements to the mobile or immobile classes
in Phase 1 also respond in more adult-like fashion to the alive question in Phase 3? HLM
analyses revealed that increases in the absolute count of functional type statements made for the
mobile class in Phase 1 predicted a more adult-like response pattern to the alive question in
Phase 3, t(113.700) = -2.246, p = .027, b = -.616. The slope of -.616 indicates that for each
additional functional statement made for the mobile class in Phase 1, there was an average
increase of .616 (out of the possible 34.70 range) units towards a more adult-like response
pattern to the alive question in Phase 2. No other significant associations emerged: biological
statements for animals, t(122.965) = 1.404, p = .163; biological statements for plants, t(113.276)
= -.571, p = .569; functional statements for immobile, t(125.229) = .725, p = .470, the alive
response pattern intercepts significantly varied across preschoolers when the number of correct
type statements was centered at the mean for each object class, Wald Z = 2.492, p =.006, var=
10.042.
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Next, I looked at the relationship between “incorrect” type statements made in Phase 1—
biological statements for mobile and immobile classes and functional statements for animal and
plant classes—and a more adult-like response pattern to the alive question in Phase 3. These
analyses targeted the following questions: Did preschoolers who inappropriately applied
biological statements to the mobile or immobile classes in Phase 1 also respond in less adult-like
fashion to the alive question in Phase 3? Did preschoolers who inappropriately applied
functional statements to the animal or plant classes in Phase 1 also respond in less adult-like
fashion to the alive question in Phase 3? HLM analyses revealed that an increase in the absolute
count of biological statements made for the mobile class in Phase 1 predicted a less adult-like
response pattern to the alive question in Phase 3, t(120.424) = 2.068, p = .041, b = .609. The
slope of .609 indicates that for each additional biological statement made for the mobile class in
Phase 1, there is an average decrease of .609 (out of the possible 34.70 range) units towards a
less adult-like response pattern to the alive question in Phase 2. No other significant associations
emerged: functional statements for animals, t(111.262) = -.836 p = .405; functional statements
for plants, t(118.091) = .843, p = .401; biological statements for immobiles, t(127.998) = -.127, p
= .899, the alive response pattern intercepts significantly varied across preschoolers when the
number of incorrect type statements was centered at the mean for each object class, Wald Z =
2.270, p = .012, var = 8.656.
In summary, analyses mapping preschoolers’ responding in Phase 1 with their responding
in Phases 2 and 3 revealed the following general results: 1) preschoolers who made more
biological statements for the plant class in Phase 1 also responded in more adult-like fashion to
the biological property questions in Phase 2; 2) preschoolers who made more biological
statements for the animal class in Phase 1 also responded in more adult-like fashion to the
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psychological property questions in Phase 2; 3) preschoolers who made more functional
statements for the animal class in Phase 1 responded in a less adult-like fashion to the
psychological property questions in Phase 2; 4) preschoolers who made more functional
statements for the mobile class in Phase 1 responded in a more adult-like fashion to the alive
question in Phase 3; and finally 5) preschoolers who made more biological statements for the
mobile class in Phase 1 responded in a less adult-like fashion to the alive question in Phase 3.
Across Phase Analyses. Phase 2: Biological Property Questions with Phase 3: Alive
Question
To investigate the relationship between a more adult-like response pattern to the
biological property questions in Phase 2 and a more adult-like response pattern to the alive
question in Phase 3, I employed an HLM analysis. This analysis targeted the following question:
Did preschoolers who responded in more adult-like fashion to the biological questions in Phase 2
also respond in more adult-like fashion to the alive question in Phase 3? HLM analysis revealed
that a more adult-like response pattern to the three biological property questions in Phase 2
predicted a more adult-like response pattern to the alive question in Phase 3, t(130.944) = 4.945,
p <.001, b = -.112. The slope of .112 indicates that for each unit the average preschoolers’
biological difference matrix became more similar to adults’ biological difference matrix there is
a .112 unit increase (out of the possible 34.70 range) in the similarity of the average
preschoolers’ alive difference matrix to the adults’ alive difference matrix. In this model, the
alive response pattern intercepts significantly varied across preschoolers when biological
response pattern was centered at the mean for each object class, Wald Z = 2.146, p = .016, var =
6.639.
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Across Phase Analyses. Phase 2: Psychological Property Questions with Phase 3: Alive
Question
To investigate the relationship between a more adult-like response pattern to the
psychological property questions in Phase 2 and a more adult-like response pattern to the alive
question in Phase 3, I employed an HLM analysis. This analysis targeted the following question:
Did preschoolers who responded in more adult-like fashion to the psychological questions in
Phase 2 also respond in more adult-like fashion to the alive question in Phase 3? HLM analysis
revealed that a more adult-like response pattern to the three psychological property questions in
Phase 2 did not predict a more adult-like response pattern to the alive question in Phase 3,
t(129.571) = 1.524, p =.130, b = .047. Although nonsignificant, a change in slope of .047
indicates that for each unit the average preschoolers’ psychological difference matrix became
more similar to adults’ psychological difference matrix there was a .047 unit decrease (out of the
possible 34.70 range) in the similarity of the average preschoolers’ alive difference matrix to the
adults’ alive difference matrix. In addition, alive response pattern intercepts significantly varied
across preschoolers when psychological response pattern was centered at the mean for each
object class, Wald Z = 2.137, p = .016, var = 8.290.
In summary, analyses mapping preschoolers’ responding in Phase 2 with their responding
in Phase 3 revealed the following general results: 1) preschoolers who responded in more adultlike fashion to the biological property questions in Phase 2 also responded in more adult-like
fashion to the alive question in Phase 3, and 2) preschoolers who responded in more adult-like
fashion to the psychological property questions did not respond in more adult-like fashion to the
alive question in Phase 3.
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Qualitative Data
I randomly assigned ten preschoolers to the qualitative condition which involved my
asking these preschoolers an additional eight open-ended questions in order to gain insight into
the reasoning behind their responses in Phases 2 and 3. I asked six questions—“How do you
know something needs water?” “How do you know something can grow?” “How do you know
something needs food?” “How do you know something can feel happy?” “How do you know
something can remember yesterday?” and “How do you know something can think thoughts?”—
in a random order after Phase 2 at each testing session. I asked two questions—“How do you
know something is alive?” and “Can you list some things that are alive?”— after Phase 3 at each
testing session.
The same four trained research assistants that coded Phase 1 statements also coded the
preschoolers’ responses to the qualitative questions. Upon completion of Testing Session 1, the
four research assistants and I created a coding scheme that best captured the type of answers
given to the qualitative questions. Upon completion of each additional testing session, the
research assistants met and I to determine if the coding scheme required updating based on the
answers given to the qualitative questions. When the coding scheme was updated, coders
reevaluated their previously assigned codes based on the updated coding scheme. One research
assistant, extensively trained in coding, checked all the codes assigned by the other three
research assistants. When disagreements arose, the research assistants met to discuss and come
to agreement as to what code best characterized the statement.
Comparing the qualitative subsample to the larger sample
To ensure that there was not a significant difference between the qualitative subsample of
preschoolers and the non-qualitative sample, I examined whether there was a significant
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difference in the number of Phase 1 statements generated at each testing session (See Table 10
for means and standard deviations). At each testing session, there was no significant difference
between the number of statements made in Phase 1 by the qualitative and non-qualitative
subsamples. TS1, t(33) = -.405, p = .656, 95% CI -10.390, 6.625]; TS2, t(33) = -.073, p = .942,
95% CI -8.660, 8.060]; TS3, t(30) = -.555, p = .583, 95% CI [-15.020, 8.590]; TS4, t(29) = 1.118, p = .273, 95% CI [-15.873, 4.656].
Next, I examined whether there was a significant difference between the qualitative
subsample of preschoolers and the non-qualitative preschoolers in the degree of correspondence
to the adult model in Phases 2 and 3 and found no significant differences. See Table 11 for the
absolute difference between preschoolers’ and adults’ response patterns to the biological,
psychological and alive questions, means and standard deviations. Thus, the qualitative
subsample of preschoolers was representative of the entire sample and participating in the
qualitative condition did not influence or alter the preschoolers’ response pattern in Phases 1, 2
or 3.
Qualitative results
In response to the qualitative questions, preschoolers overwhelmingly offered answers of
two general types. For the Exemplar-Type of answer, preschoolers offered an example of an
object that engages in the process being asked about. For example, given the question “How do
you know something needs water?” an Exemplar-Type answer would be “a plant does.” For the
Reference-Type of answer, preschoolers referred to an aspect of an object that can be considered
biological or psychological. For example, given the question “How do you know something can
grow?,” a biological Reference-Type answer would be:, “because it can die” (biological
property), “because it growls” (biological action), or “its leaves can grow” (biological part of an
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object), A psychological Reference-Type answer would be, for example, “because it has
imagination,” or “because it wants to scare people,” or any statement that involves emotions,
thoughts, memories, or intentions. Figure 17 presents the type of answers offered by the
preschoolers in the qualitative condition.
I examined the number of the two types of answers offered by the preschoolers in the
qualitative condition at each testing session (see Figures 18 – 21). I was also interested in
comparing how preschoolers answered the qualitative questions compared to how the adult
sample answered the same qualitative questions (see Figure 22 for the number of the types of
answers offered by adults to the qualitative questions).
Answers to the biological qualitative questions. Two general patterns emerged after
examining the different types of answers preschoolers offered to the biological qualitative
questions at each testing session. First, preschoolers offered “plants” as exemplars for the
biological qualitative questions at a higher rate than they did for the psychological, alive or alive
list qualitative questions which indicated that preschoolers in my sample understood plants as
biological entities but did not construe plants as psychological entities or as entities that are alive.
Similarly, the adult sample offered “plants” as exemplars for the biological and alive qualitative
questions at higher rates than the psychological qualitative questions.
Second, preschoolers offered “animals” as exemplars for the biological qualitative
questions at a higher rate than they did for the psychological qualitative questions at the first two
testing sessions. However, at Testing Sessions 3 and 4, preschoolers offered “animals” more
equally for both the biological and psychological qualitative questions, which indicated that
preschoolers in my sample initially understood animals as biological entities and only later
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understood animals as also psychological entities. In contrast, the adult sample equally offered
“animals” as exemplars of biological and psychological entities.
Answers to the psychological qualitative questions. Two general themes emerged after
examining the different types of answers preschoolers offered to the psychological qualitative
questions at each testing session. First, preschoolers offered “humans” as exemplars for the
psychological qualitative questions at a higher rate than they did for the biological qualitative
questions at the first two testing sessions. However, at Testing Session 3 preschoolers
dramatically reduced the number of “humans” offered as exemplars (from 9 to 1) and at Testing
Session 4 did not offer “human” as exemplars for the psychological qualitative questions. These
results indicated that initially preschoolers in the qualitative subsample understood humans as
psychological entities but with age did not offer humans as examples of psychological entities.
In contrast, the adult sample offered “humans” as examples of both biological and psychological
entities.
Second, it was not until Testing Session 2 that preschoolers began referencing
psychological properties when asked the three psychological qualitative questions. In contrast,
the preschoolers never referenced psychological properties when answering the biological
qualitative questions. These results indicated that preschoolers broadly distinguish psychological
processes from biological processes. Adults also referenced psychological properties when
answering the psychological qualitative questions but did not when answering the biological
qualitative questions.
Answers to the alive qualitative question. A general theme emerged after examining
the different types of answers preschoolers offered to the alive qualitative question at each
testing session. At the first three testing sessions, preschoolers offered both Exemplar and
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Reference-type statements when asked the alive qualitative question. However, by Testing
Session 4, preschoolers no longer offered Exemplar-type statements for the alive qualitative
question and only offered Reference-type statements. Referencing biological or psychological
processes as an answer to, “How do you know something is alive?” is a more appropriate type of
answer than to offer exemplars that are alive. The adult sample overwhelmingly (35 vs. 7, see
Figure 22) made Reference-type statements in response to the alive qualitative questions. These
results indicated that preschoolers in my sample demonstrated an increased sophistication in their
understanding of alive by appropriately applying only Reference-Type answers to the alive
question at the final testing session.
Answers to the alive list question. Two general themes emerged after examining the
different types of answers preschoolers offered to the alive list qualitative question at each
testing session. First, at the first three testing sessions, preschoolers offered both Exemplar-type
and Reference-type statements when asked the alive list qualitative question. However, by
Testing Session 4, preschoolers no longer offered Reference-type statements for the alive list
qualitative question and only offer Exemplar-type statements. Offering exemplars of objects that
are alive when asked, “Can you list some things that are alive?” is a more appropriate type of
answer than to reference a biological or psychological process. The adult sample
overwhelmingly (107 vs. 1, see Figure 22) made Exemplar-type statements in response to the
alive list qualitative questions. These results indicate that preschoolers in my sample
demonstrated an increased sophistication by appropriately applying only Exemplar-type answers
to the alive list qualitative question by the final testing session.
Second, at each testing session, preschoolers overwhelmingly offered “animals” as
exemplars when asked to list things that are alive (followed by humans, plants, person-made
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objects, ambiguous items, and fictional characters). Interestingly, there was a dramatic increase
in number of “animal” exemplars offered at Testing Session 4 (from 17 at Testing Session 3 to
34 at Testing Session 4, see Figures 20 and 21). In addition, preschoolers offered “humans” as
exemplars of objects that are alive pretty equally across each testing session. At the first three
testing sessions, preschoolers offered “plants” as exemplars of objects that are alive; however,
preschoolers did not offer “plants” as exemplars of objects that are alive at Testing Session 4.
These results indicate that preschoolers initially understood “animals” as alive and with age
increasingly conceptualized animals as alive. At the same time, preschoolers understood that
“humans” are alive but there did not appear to be a shift in this understanding with age.
Preschoolers also initially understood plants as alive but did not list plants as objects that are
alive at the last testing session. The majority of things listed by the adult sample as alive were
animals, followed by plants then humans.
Discussion
This study was designed to examine the structural organization of preschoolers’ living
kinds concept and the nature of developmental change in that concept from roughly 3.5- to 4.5years-old. To what extent is preschoolers’ living kinds conceptualization structured and to what
extent does this organization undergo structural change during the preschool period? Through
the use of a longitudinal design, alternate means of indexing preschoolers’ conceptualization, and
converging statistical analyses, the current study offers more comprehensive evidence regarding
the nature of developmental change in preschoolers’ living kinds concept. The first analytic
strategy I employed involved examining preschoolers’ responding within different testing
contexts and domains of living kinds understanding over developmental time. The second
analytic strategy I employed involved examining interrelations among preschoolers’ responding
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across testing contexts and domains of understanding, but collapsed across age in the sample.
Both analytic strategies yielded the same overall conclusion and, in general, support the core
competence approach, suggesting that certain aspects of the biological framework are already in
place early in the preschool period. However, my findings also qualify the core competence
approach by demonstrating that conceptual reorganization does indeed occur during the
preschool period and that, therefore, cognitive development is not simply the elaboration of an
existing skeletal conceptual framework. More specifically, I found that in different testing
contexts, preschoolers demonstrated different levels of understanding and that the pattern of
development observed involved both progressive elaboration of an existing biological framework
and organizational restructuring. In other words, the understanding that preschoolers between
3.5 and 4.5 years evidenced in different testing contexts and different domains (biological,
psychological) had not yet fully integrated into an organizationally structured living kinds
conceptualization, suggesting that qualitative reorganization characterizes aspects of
preschoolers’ living kinds conceptual development.
Different Testing Contexts, Differential Developmental Patterning and Levels of
Understanding
By examining preschoolers’ responding in different testing contexts and tracing the
development in each context over the course of the year-long study, I found that depending on
the methodology employed, preschoolers demonstrated different levels of understanding and that
the type of development (elaboration of an existing mature framework or conceptual
reorganization) that occurred largely depended on what domain of understanding (biological,
psychological) was under investigation. This study employed two primary means of indexing
preschoolers living kinds conceptualization—asking preschoolers to generate information (Phase
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1 and Qualitative responding) and asking preschoolers yes/no questions (Phases 2 and 3
responding). When asked to generate information, children demonstrated that they largely
distinguish living things from nonliving things, which suggests that a biologically based skeletal
framework is in place early in the preschool period. However, gaps in preschoolers’ thinking
were also evident, suggesting that aspects of a biologically based skeletal framework have not
yet been constructed during the preschool period. Furthermore, when preschoolers were asked
yes /no questions about objects of different classes, they showed even more dramatically the
extent to which living kinds conceptual development in the preschool period involves qualitative
reorganization, not just quantitative elaboration of a core conceptual framework.
Phase 1 results revealed that preschoolers applied biological statements to the animal and
plant classes and applied functional statements to the immobile class at each testing session;
however, preschoolers were less clear on what type of statements should be applied to the mobile
class. Thus, when generating information about different classes of objects, preschoolers
demonstrated a broad distinction between living and nonliving kinds by appropriately applying
biological statements to living kinds and appropriately applying functional statements to
nonliving immobile kinds. These results largely support the core competence view and
disconfirm Carey’s (1985) assertion that preschoolers do not possess a biologically based
skeletal framework for understanding the living world. In addition, the finding that preschoolers
applied biological statements to plants which were displayed motionless does not support
Piaget’s (1929) theory because plants appearing motionless did not hinder preschoolers’
understanding of plants as biological entities. However, the distinction preschoolers made
between living and nonliving kinds broke down when they were asked to consider mobile objects
for which they made a similar number of biological and functional statements at Testing Sessions
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1, 2 and 4. This result lends some support to Piaget’s (1929) theory that preschoolers conflate
livingness with motion because preschoolers, in general, did make more biological statements
when viewing mobile artifacts than immobile artifacts, as if the motion displayed by the mobile
objects caused children to think about them in more biological terms than the immobile objects
that were displayed motionless. Yet, at testing session 3, preschoolers made more functional
statements than mobile statements for the mobile object. Although, this shift in the type of
statements generated for mobile objects was not evident at the final testing session (possibly
reflecting a bit of regression following a transition) it still points to the possibility that structural
reorganization in thinking about mobile objects occurred by the latter testing sessions.
The qualitative results revealed that the subsample of preschoolers—who were asked
eight open-ended questions in order to examine how they know whether an object engages in
biological and psychological properties or is alive—appropriately offered Exemplar-type
statements or Reference-type statements at each testing session. Preschoolers predominately
referenced animals, plants and humans as examples of objects that are alive. Preschoolers also
referenced artifacts (i.e., a chair) as examples of an object that is not biological, psychological or
alive. In addition, preschoolers predominately referenced other biological or psychological
properties when asked how they know an object engages in biological, psychological properties
or is alive. Furthermore, at the final testing session preschoolers offered only Reference-type
statements to the question, “How do you know something is alive?” and only offered Exemplartype statements to the question, “Can you list things that are alive?” This pattern of answers to
the qualitative questions that preschoolers displayed at the final two testing sessions is strikingly
similar to the pattern of answers offered by our adult sample. By appropriately offering
Exemplar-type and Reference-type statements and by differentially offering the most appropriate
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type of statements to the alive qualitative questions at the final testing session, preschoolers
demonstrated that when they are given the opportunity to generate information they do broadly
distinguish between living and nonliving kinds, which supports the core competence view.
However, these results also point to a structural reorganization occurring in preschooler’s living
kinds concept occurring between the third and fourth testing session, specifically in
preschoolers’ understanding of “alive.”
Thus, preschoolers showed that they largely distinguish between living and nonliving
kinds when given the opportunity to generate statements but also demonstrated some confusion
in fully demarcating the division between the living and person-made objects. In the context of
preschoolers’ responses to yes/no questions about objects’ biological and psychological
properties, preschoolers showed even greater variability and marked deviations from adult living
kinds conceptualization. Specifically, preschoolers in Phase 2 ran the gamut from exhibiting
organizationally stable conceptualization across developmental time, progressive elaboration of
an existing biological framework, and robust conceptual reorganization between 3.5 and 4.5
years.
With respect to preschoolers’ biological property understanding over the course of the
study, the developmental patterning that emerged can be characterized as both conceptual
reorganization and a progressive elaboration of an existing, biologically based skeletal
framework. Preschoolers’ understanding of biological properties did become increasingly adultlike over the four testing sessions but also transitioned from chance level responding at the first
two testing sessions to significant departures from chance and closer alignment with the adult
model at the final two testing sessions. This suggests a potential conceptual reorganization
between the first and second pairs of testing sessions—going from reduced, inconsistent
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evidence for a biologically based framework (via chance level responding) to clear evidence for
a biologically based framework (moving closer to the adult model than chance). MDS results,
however, indicate that preschoolers’ biological property understanding involves the progressive
elaboration of a biologically based skeletal framework between 3.5 and 4.5 years. The MDS
plots, before and after the median age split (see Figure 11), demonstrate that even at the earliest
ages studied, preschoolers were broadly distinguishing living things from nonliving things and
that with age preschoolers more clearly distinguished living things from nonliving things,
suggesting that a biologically oriented skeletal framework is already in place early in the
preschool years. Nonetheless, preschoolers’ understanding of biological properties at the first
two testing sessions equally mapped onto both the adult model and the animal model of
responding, transitioning to being similar only to the adult model by the final two testing
sessions. This suggests that preschoolers’ biological property understanding does undergo some
degree of reorganization between 3.5 and 4.5 years, evidenced by a shift from an understanding
that only animals engage in biological properties and that plants, mobile and immobile objects do
not toward a more adult-like conception of biological properties which positions both animals
and plants as engaging in biological processes, in contrast to both mobile and immobile objects.
That preschoolers broadly distinguished living things from nonliving things in terms of
biological processes by grouping animals and plants together and contrasting them with mobile
and immobile objects does not support Piaget’s (1929) theory that preschoolers conflate
livingness with mobility, at least in terms of biological properties. These results also do not
support Carey’s (1985) theory that preschoolers lack a biologically based framework for
understanding living kinds. However, these results do point to some form of qualitative
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reorganization taking place in preschoolers’ living kinds conceptualization between 3.5 and 4.5
years.
With respect to preschoolers’ psychological understanding (Phase 2 responding) over the
course of the study, the developmental patterning that emerged can be characterized as relatively
stable and conceptually mature. At each testing session, preschoolers’ psychological
understanding was significantly closer to adults’ psychological understanding than chance, was
more similar to the adult model than to any of the hypothetical models, and did not evidence
significant development over the course of this study, suggesting that a relatively mature skeletal
conceptual framework is already in place at 3.5 years. The MDS plots on preschoolers’
psychological understanding, before and after the median age split (see Figure 13), demonstrate
that even at the earliest ages, preschoolers were broadly distinguishing living things from
nonliving things and that with age preschoolers were assigning psychological properties to the
animal class yet not to the plant, mobile or immobile classes. The MDS results further suggest
that development in preschoolers’ psychological understanding between 3.5 and 4.5 years is best
characterized as progressive elaboration of a relatively mature skeletal framework, one which
involves a broad distinction between classes of objects based on whether the class is alive or not
and later becomes more adult-like by restricting the assignment of psychological properties to
animals only, a subclass of living kinds.
With respect to preschooler’s understanding of the concept “alive” (Phase 3 responding)
over the course of the study, the developmental patterning that emerged can be characterized as
conceptual reorganization. Preschoolers’ understanding of “alive” became increasingly adultlike over the four testing sessions by going from significantly further from adults’ responding
than chance at the first two testing sessions to not significantly different than chance at the last
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two testing sessions, transitioning from clear evidence for a conceptual framework that was
qualitatively distinct from an adult model (below chance level responding) toward no systematic
evidence for a biologically based conceptual framework (chance level responding). More
specifically, at the first two testing sessions, preschoolers’ understanding of alive equally
mapped onto the immobile model and the animal model yet at the final two testing sessions
mapped predominantly onto the animal model. In addition, the MDS plots on preschoolers’
understanding of alive, before and after the median age split (see Figure 16), demonstrate that at
the earliest ages, preschoolers were broadly distinguishing the object classes based on mobility
by grouping mobile things (animals and mobile objects) as distinct from immobile things (plants
and immobile objects). With age, preschoolers no longer broadly distinguished the classes based
on mobility and instead began to clearly treat the animal exemplars as separate from the other
three classes of objects. Taken together, these results underscore the conceptual reorganization
that takes place in the development of preschoolers’ understanding of alive between 3.5 and 4.5
years, characterized by shifting from a framework in which things that move are alive toward a
framework in which animals are alive but plants, mobile and immobile objects are not. These
results lend some support to Piaget’s (1929) theory because they suggest that at younger ages,
preschoolers broadly distinguish living and nonliving kinds’ exemplars based on mobility; by the
last two testing sessions, preschoolers had corrected this error and had begun to group the mobile
objects with the immobile objects, no longer distinguishing exemplars based on mobility. But
even by 4.5 years, preschoolers were still appealing to an animal model in their understanding of
“alive,” suggesting that further conceptual reorganization needs to take place before a
biologically based framework is in place for the concept of alive.
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Depending on the methodology employed (statement generation vs. yes/no responding),
preschoolers demonstrated different levels of understanding. When asked to generate
information in response to seeing an object (Phase 1 responding) children demonstrated that they
broadly distinguish living things from nonliving things by grouping plants and animals and
distinguishing them from immobile objects. However, preschoolers also demonstrated some
conceptual confusion when asked to reason about mobile objects by not clearly grouping them
with immobile objects and not clearly distinguishing them from living things. In addition, when
asked open-ended questions about biological and psychological processes and livingness
(Qualitative responding), preschoolers, in general, demonstrated organizationally structured
understanding consistent with adult thinking. Yet, even when generating statements, some
evidence for structural reorganization exists. In Phase 1, at testing session 3 preschoolers made a
shift in the type of statements they made for the mobile objects by appropriately making more
functional than biological statements. In the qualitative conditions, there is a clear transition in
understanding between the third and fourth testing sessions in regard to the alive qualitative
questions, demonstrated by the shift in the type of answers offered by preschoolers becoming
more adult-like. Thus, even in the context of generating statements, structural reorganization in
preschoolers’ living kinds conceptualization is evident by shifts in the type of statements they
make at the final testing sessions. When preschoolers were asked yes/no questions about objects
of different classes (Phases 2 and 3 responding), results did not reveal the same level of
conceptual development as when they generated information and even more strongly suggest that
conceptual reorganization occurs in preschoolers’ living kinds concept between 3.5 and 4.5 years
old.
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Furthermore, the type of development evidenced depends largely on the domain of
understanding (biological or psychological) that is under investigation. When examining the
domain of biological understanding by specifically examining preschoolers’ understanding of
biological properties (growth, needing water and food) and the property of alive, both conceptual
reorganization as well as progressive elaboration of an existing biological framework is
evidenced. In the domain of psychological understanding, preschoolers did not evidenced
significant development; however, results indicate that by roughly 3.5-years-old, preschoolers’
already possess a relatively mature skeletal framework. Thus, some aspects of preschoolers’
living kinds conceptual development are characterized by progressive elaboration of an existing
skeletal biological framework and other aspects of development are characterized by
reorganization of conceptual structures. Overall, these findings suggest that a biological
framework for understanding the living and nonliving kinds concept is still being
developmentally constructed between the ages of roughly 3.5- to 4.5-years-old and that it is not
until after 4.5 years that an organizationally structured and stable living kinds concept emerges
across multiple contexts and domains of understanding.
Relations Across Testing Contexts and Domains of Understanding: Evidence for Both
Structured Organization and Fragmentation
To further investigate the nature of structural organization in preschoolers’ living kinds
concept, I examined whether preschoolers’ responding in one testing context or domain of
understanding predicted responding in another testing context or domain of understanding,
collapsed across developmental time. If preschoolers evidenced appropriately (e.g., adult-like)
structured conceptual organization across testing contexts, this would lend some support to the
core competence approach by indicating that a biologically based conceptual framework is in
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place and can be applied both when making statements about different classes of objects and
when answering questions about biological and psychological processes as well as about whether
an object is alive. If on the other hand, children’s responding in one testing context or one
domain of understanding was not related to their responding in another testing context or domain
of understanding, this would suggest that preschoolers’ understanding of the living world is
fragmented and lacks broad structural organization, contrary to the core competence view.
Furthermore, if children’s responding in one testing context was related to responding in another
but not in a way consistent with adult responding, this would suggest that preschooler’s
understanding of the living world is still qualitatively distinct in important ways from that of
adults. Results from examining preschoolers’ responding across testing contexts and domains of
understanding reinforce the idea that preschoolers’ living kinds concept is both appropriately
organizationally structured and fragmented/qualitatively distinct in its structuring during the
developmental period between 3.5 and 4.5 years.
Evidence for appropriately structured organization in preschoolers’ living kinds concept
came from the following results: (1) preschoolers who made more biological type statements for
the plant class also had a more adult-like understanding of biological properties; (2) preschoolers
who made more biological type statements for the animal class had a more adult-like
understanding of psychological properties, and those who made more functional statements for
the animal class had a less adult-like understanding of psychological properties; (3) preschoolers
who made more functional statements for the mobile class had a more adult-like understating of
alive, and those who made more biological statements for the mobile class had a less adult-like
understanding of alive; and (4) preschoolers whose biological understanding was more adultlike also had a more adult-like understanding of alive. In contrast, evidence for conceptual
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fragmentation/qualitatively distinct structuring in preschoolers’ living kinds concept came from
the following results: (1) preschoolers who had a more adult-like understanding of biological
properties had a less adult-like understanding of psychological properties; and (2) preschoolers
whose psychological understanding was more adult-like did not have a more adult-like
understanding of alive.
Thus, the different types of statements (biological or functional) preschoolers’ generated
for the four classes of objects in Phase 1 differentially mapped onto their understanding of
biological, psychological and livingness understanding in Phases 2 and 3—with preschoolers
understanding of plants in Phase 1 being related to their biological understanding in Phases 2,
their understanding of animals in Phase 1 related to their psychological understanding in Phase 2,
and their understanding of mobile objects in Phase 1 related to their alive understanding in Phase
3. Furthermore, preschoolers’ understanding of biological properties in Phase 2 was not
associated with their understanding of psychological properties in Phase 2, and their
understanding of biological properties in Phase 2 mapped on to their understanding of alive in
Phase 3, but their understanding of psychological properties in Phase 2 did not map on to their
understanding of alive in Phase 3. Overall, these results lend some support to the core
competence approach by indicating that a degree of structured conceptual organization is in
place during the preschool period. However, these results also qualify the core competence
approach by indicating that certain aspects of an adult-like biological framework are not yet in
place during the preschool period.
To further examine the extent to which preschoolers’ living kinds concept is structured
and systematic, I looked at the rate of change that took place over the year-long study in each
domain of understanding—biological and psychological. If the rate of change was relatively
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consistent across the two domains of understanding, this would lend further support to the view
that a structured conceptual organization is present during the preschool period. If on the other
hand, the rate of development differed between the two domains of understanding, this would
lend support to the view that conceptualization fragmentation better characterizes the living
kinds concept during the preschool period. In fact the rates of development during the course of
the study varied depending on the domain under investigation. On average, preschoolers’
biological property understanding became roughly 21% closer to adults’ conceptualization while
preschoolers’ psychological property understanding became roughly 2% closer to adults’
conceptualization. Thus, during this one year period, preschoolers’ biological property
understanding evidenced a greater rate of development relative to preschoolers’ psychological
property understanding, suggesting relative independence in the development of each domain of
understanding between 3.5 and 4.5 years.
In summary, by examining preschoolers’ responding across testing contexts and domains
of understanding, as well as the rate of development within each domain of understanding, I
found some evidence that a structured conceptual organization is in place, which supports the
core competence view. However, I also found evidence that aspects of preschoolers’ living
kinds conceptualization are somewhat fragmented and lack integration across testing phases and
domains of understanding, which lends support to the view that a biological framework is being
constructed during this period rather than already in place.
Limitations and Future Directions
Perhaps the biggest limitations of the current study are its small sample size and limited
number of testing sessions. These limitations require analyses to be conducted at the group
level, with focus specifically on inter-individual variation, and thus can only speak to the average
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preschooler’s living kinds conceptual development. For a true study of developmental change,
one that taps into the central question of process—namely, how is a biologically based
framework for understanding living and nonliving kinds constructed during childhood—intraindividual stability and change over time need to be the central focus of analysis. Furthermore,
even with this study’s more limited focus at the group level of analysis, its small sample size and
limited number of testing sessions preclude systematic, quantitative efforts to chart actual growth
functions in preschooler responding across time. And with respect to the second analytic strategy
employed—namely, looking at the interrelations among indices and domains of
conceptualization—insufficient sample size limited analyses to the sample as a whole, collapsed
across age/testing sessions. Time simply could not be taken into consideration because the
models failed to converge with the parameter of age included. To allow for intra-individual
analyses and for a richer examination of the nature of developmental change in preschooler’s
living kinds concept (both at the group and individual levels), future work should include a larger
sample size but more importantly, many more sampling points conducted with each child.
Another limitation of this study was the duration of the study. I tested preschoolers over the
course of one year, beginning testing when they were roughly 3.5-years-old and completing
testing when they were roughly 4.5-years-old. Had I began testing when children were younger,
roughly 2.5-years old, I would have gained insight into the early developmental trajectories of
different domains of living kinds understanding. Had I continued testing when the children were
older, I would have been able to more fully map out the developmental trajectory of the living
kinds concept. Future work should focus on developmentally extended longitudinal study of
living kinds conceptualization in order to more fully elucidate the nature of both change and
constancy in children’s living kinds concept.
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Conclusion
Despite these limitations, the current study extends previous research by offering a more
complete assessment of the organizational structure in preschoolers’ living kinds
conceptualization and its potential developmental transformation, via (1) the utilization of a
longitudinal design with four testing sessions conducted over the course of approximately one
year; (2) the employment of a broad stimulus set and alternate indices of understanding; (3)
inquiries of children to reason about different domains of the living kinds understanding
(biological, psychological); (4) inquiries of a subset of preschoolers to gain insight into the
reasoning behind their ascriptions of “alive” and particular biological or psychological properties
to an object; (5) inquiries of children to generate a list of objects that are alive; and (6)
employment of complementary analytic strategies. The design of the current study allowed me
to investigate both developmental stability and transformation in the organizational structure of
preschoolers’ living kinds conceptualization between roughly 3.5 and 4.5 years of age and to
evaluate the nature of its developmental patterning, comparing developmental models of both
conceptual reorganization and elaboration of a core competence. Results both support and
qualify the core competence approach to conceptual development by demonstrating that certain
aspects of the biological framework are in place early in the preschool period while highlighting
the fact that other aspects have not yet been constructed. My results further qualify the core
competence approach by demonstrating that conceptual reorganization in living kinds
conceptualization does indeed occur during the preschool period and is not simply the
elaboration of an existing skeletal conceptual framework. Based on these results, I argue that a
biologically based, skeletal framework for understanding the living world is being constructed
during the preschool years and that for the field to move forward, we need to revise the current
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theoretical debate regarding the nature of developmental change in preschoolers’ living kinds
conceptualization. We need to move past asking whether living kinds conceptual development
involves either progressive elaboration of an already mature, core skeletal conceptual
frameworks or fundamental conceptual reorganization to instead appreciate how transformation
and continuity, reorganization and elaboration, are complimentary processes that give rise to
conceptual development.
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Appendix A: Tables
Table 1
Procedure Summary
Phase
Stimuli
1
16 objects
(4/class)
2

12 objects
(3/class)a

Question Type
Open Ended

Question
What can you say about
this thing?

Response Types
Biological and
functional type
statements

3 Biological
Yes/No

"Does this one grow?"
"Does this one need
water?"
"Does this one need
food?"
"Does this one think
thoughts?"
"Does this one feel
happy?"
"Does this one
remember yesterday?"

Yes or no responses

3 Psychological
Yes/No

3

12 objects
(3/class) a

1 Alive-Yes/No

"Is this thing alive?"

Yes or no responses

Qualitativeb

N/A

3 Biological Open
Ended
(after phase 2)

"How do you know
something can grow?"

Exemplar-type and
Reference-type
answers

3 Psychological
Open Ended (after
phase 2)

"How do you know
something can think
thoughts?"
"How do you know
something can feel
happy?"
"How do you know
something can
remember?"

2 Alive
Open Ended
(after phase 3)

"How do you know
something is alive?"

a
b

"How do you know
something needs
water?"
"How do you know
something needs food?"

"Can you list some
things that are alive?"

The same 12 objects were used for both phase 2 and 3.
Qualitative data was collected from the entire adult sample and a subset of the preschool sample.
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Table 2
Number of Biological and Functional Statements Made by Preschoolers at Each
Testing Session
Animal
Biological
Functional
Total
Plant
Biological
Functional
Total
Mobile
Biological
Functional
Total
Immobile
Biological
Functional
Total
All Classes
Biological
Functional
Total

TS1(N=35 )

TS2(N=35 )

TS3(N=32 )

TS4(N=31 )

240
6
246

290
1
291

344
3
347

309
5
314

135
16
151

185
8
193

188
0
188

192
9
201

48
77
125

65
86
151

57
120
177

74
83
157

27
90
117

33
147
180

19
152
171

13
147
160

450
189
639

573
242
815

608
275
883

588
244
832
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Table 3
Phase 1: Total Biological and Functional Statements Made at Each Testing Session: Means and
Standard Deviations
TS 1

TS 2

TS 3

TS 4

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

Biological

6.86

5.52

8.29

5.43

10.75

7.27

9.97

5.90

Functional

0.17

0.71

0.03

0.17

0.09

0.30

0.16

0.52

Total

7.03

5.48

8.31

5.42

10.84

7.38

10.13

5.80

3.86
0.46

2.09
0.78

5.29
0.23

2.46
0.55

5.88
0.00

2.78
0.00

6.19
0.29

2.29
0.59

4.31

2.45

5.51

2.42

5.88

2.78

6.48

2.43

1.37
2.20

1.61
2.18

1.86
2.46

1.38
1.98

1.78
3.75

1.29
2.64

2.39
2.68

2.30
1.80

3.57

2.91

4.31

2.39

5.53

3.17

5.06

2.74

Biological
Functional

0.77
2.57

1.90
2.27

0.94
4.20

1.43
2.52

0.56
4.75

0.88
2.85

0.45
4.74

0.93
3.27

Total

3.34

2.83

5.14

2.79

5.34

2.98

5.16

3.23

Animal

Plant
Biological
Functional
Total
Mobile
Biological
Functional
Total
Immobile
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Table 4

Phase 1: Comparing Number of Statements Preschoolers Made for the Object
Classes: t’s, p’s, and CI’s
TS 1

TS 2

TS 3

TS 4

(34) = 3.430
0.002*
1.106, 4.322

(34) = 4.026
< .001*
1.387, 4.213

(31) = 4.383
< .001*
2.657, 7.281

(30) = 4.317
< .001*
1.921, 5.370

(34) = 4.899
< .001*
2.023, 4.891

(34) = 4.999
< .001*
2.374, 5.626

(31) = 5.467
< .001*
3.330, 7.295

(30) = 6.392
< .001*
3.446, 6.683

(34) = 4.067
<.001*
1.844, 5.528

(34) = 4.019
< .001*
1.568, 4.775

(31) = 5.562
< .001*
3.483, 7.517

(30) = 6.676
< .001*
3.448, 6.487

(34) = 1.886
0.068
-0.058, 1.543

(34) = 3.106
0.004*
.415, 1.985

(31) = 0.597
0.555
-0.831, 1.519

(30) = 3.344
0.002*
.553, 2.286

(34) = 2.244
0.031
0.092, 1.851

(34) = 0.929
0.359
-0.441, 1.184

(31) = 0.979
0.335
-0.575, 1.638

(30) = 2.791
0.009
.355,2.290

t
(34) = 0.478
(34) = -2.079
(31) = 0.432
p
0.636
0.045
0.669
95% CI
-0.743, 1.200
-1.683, -0.019
-0.698, 1.073
Note: *indicates significance at <.05 after Dunn’s correction.

(30) = -0.190
0.85
-1.136, 0.942

Animal vs. Plant
t
p
95% CI
Animal vs. Mobile
t
p
95% CI
Animal vs. Immobile
t
p
95% CI
Plant vs. Mobile
t
p
95% CI
Plant vs. Immobile
t
p
95% CI
Mobile vs. Immobile
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Table 5
Phase 1: Type of Statements Preschoolers Made at Each Testing Session: Means and Standard
Deviations
TS 1
TS 2
TS 3
TS 4
Statement Type

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

Biological

12.86

7.71

16.37

8.58

19.00

9.65

18.97

8.89

Functional

5.40

4.86

6.91

4.00

8.59

5.18

7.87

4.65
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Table 6
Phase 1: Comparing Type of Statements Preschoolers Made for the Object Classes: t’s,

p’s, and CI’s
TS 1

TS 2

Animal Bio vs. Func.
(34) = 7.000
(34) = 8.978
t
<.001*
<.001*
p
4.745, 8.627
6.388, 10.126
95% CI
Plant Bio vs. Func
(34) = 10.117
(34) = 11.456
t
<.001*
p
<.001*
2.717, 4.083
4.160, 5.954
95% CI
Mobile Bio vs. Func
(34) = -1.968
(34) = -1.462
t
0.057
0.153
p
-1.684, .027
-1.434, .234
95% CI
Immobile Bio vs. Func
(34) = -3.462
(34) = -6.416
t
0.001*
<.001*
p
2.856, -.744
-4.289, -2.225
95% CI
Note: *indicates significance at <.05 after Dunn’s correction.
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TS 3

TS 4

(31) = 8.414
<.001*
8.073, 13.239

(30) = 9.046
<.001*
7.593, 12.020

(31) = 11.957
<.001*
4.873, 6.877

(30) = 14.381
<.001*
5.065, 6.742

(31) = -4.153
<.001*
-2.936, -1.002

(30) = -.523
0.605
-1.424, .843

(31) = -7.814
<.001*
-5.280, -3.095

(30) = -6.817
<.001*
-5.576, -3.005

Table 7
Phase 2: Absolute Difference Between Preschoolers’ Biological Response Pattern and the Adult and
Hypothetical Models at Each Testing Session: Means and Standard Deviations
TS 1
TS 2
TS 3
TS 4
M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

Adult Model

85.33a

13.05

83.67a

12.67

73.93a

25.07

64.78a

23.04

Animal Model

88.51a

12.32

87.80a

12.30

86.47b

17.57

82.55b

16.53

Mobile Model

101.17b

6.53

99.71b

7.10

101.66ce

5.14

100.39ce

7.15

Immobile Model
96.57c
9.81
97.29b
10.63
92.34de
9.55
96.23de
8.12
Note: Means in a column (testing session) with different subscripts were significantly different at the p <
.05 level.
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Table 8
Phase 2: Absolute Difference Between Preschoolers' Psychological Response Pattern and the Adult
and Hypothetical Models at Each Testing Session: Means and Standard Deviations
TS1
TS2
TS3
TS4
M

SD

Adult Model

67.46a

14.91

Animal Model

85.54b

Mobile Model

103.69c

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

62.11a 13.35

62.05a

17.93

65.73a

19.40

17.73

80.91b

18.37

79.84b

18.01

80.97b

23.59

5.51

102.83c

5.88

100.66c 10.07

100.03c

8.26

Immobile Model
92.11d 10.02
91.89d
9.85
91.16d
9.65
93.71d
9.83
Note: Means in a column (testing session) with different subscripts were significantly different at the p <
.05 level.
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Table 9
Phase 3: Absolute Difference Between Preschoolers’ Alive Response Pattern and the Adult and
Hypothetical Models: Means and Standard Deviations
TS 1
TS 2
TS 3
TS 4
M
SD
M
SD
M
SD
M
SD
32.94a
2.54
33.01a
2.95
30.50a
6.61
28.72a
8.70
Adult Model
28.97b
6.69
28.14b
5.78
22.09b
12.56
22.13b 12.28
Animal Model
32.89a
4.99
31.66b
9.47
31.28a
6.33
30.94a
5.77
Mobile Model
28.97b
7.09
28.43b
6.71
30.78a
5.34
30.71a
5.26
Immobile Model
Note: Means in a column (testing session) with different subscripts were significantly different at the p <
.05 level.
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Table 10
Comparing Number of Phase 1 Statements Made by the Qualitative Subsample Versus the NonQualitative Subsample of Preschoolers: Means and Standard Deviations
TS 1
TS 2
TS 3
TS 4
M
SD
M
SD
M
SD
M
SD
Non-Qualitative
17.72 11.40
23.20 11.03
26.79 15.09
25.39 12.63
Qualitative
19.60 10.55
23.20 10.86
30.00 10.57
31.00 10.88
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Table 11
Comparing Phases 2 and 3 Response Patterns in Relation to the Adult Model: Qualitative
Subsample Versus the Non-Qualitative Subsample of Preschoolers: Means and Standard
Deviations
TS 1
TS 2
TS 3
TS 4
M
SD
M
SD
M
SD
M
SD
Biological
Non-Qualitative
Qualitative
Psychological
Non-Qualitative
Qualitative
Alive
Non-Qualitative
Qualitative

84.87
86.49

14.22
10.09

84.22
82.29

13.44
11.04

71.8
80.3

24.79
26.49

67.28
57.56

23.42
21.71

66.23
70.53

16.01
11.89

59.99
67.4

12.61
14.35

61.80
62.82

19.74
11.94

64.84
68.29

19.94
18.78

32.78
33.34

2.49
2.74

32.89
33.30

3.18
2.41

30.29
31.13

7.12
5.15

28.12
30.44

9.93
3.16
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Appendix B: Figures

Figure 1. A schematic depiction of English and Indonesian names for fundamental biological concepts.
Source: “Naming Practices and the Acquisition of Key Biological Concepts,” by Anggoro, Waxman &
Medin, 2008, Psychological Science, 19, 314-319. Copyright 2008 American Psychological Association.
Note: dashed box and greying of ‘Animal” circle was added by Margett-Jordan.
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Phase One Stimuli
Livingness

not alive

no movement

Movement

movement

alive

Figure 2. Stimuli shown for Phase 1.
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Phase Two & Three
Stimuli
Livingness

not alive

no movement

Movement

movement

alive

Figure 3. Stimuli shown for Phases 2 and 3.
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Figure 4. Example of a preschooler’s biological property difference matrix. A = animal, P = plant, M =
mobile object, I = immobile object.
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A1

A2

A3

P1

P2

P3

M1

M2

M3

I1

I2

I3

A1

0.002 0.002 0.073 0.051 0.064 2.782 2.836 2.836 2.729 2.729 2.782

A2

0.000 0.089 0.063 0.077 2.945 3.000 3.000 2.890 2.890 2.945

A3

0.089 0.063 0.077 2.945 3.000 3.000 2.890 2.890 2.945

P1

0.003 0.001 2.386 2.440 2.440 2.349 2.349 2.387

P2

0.001 2.508 2.563 2.563 2.467 2.467 2.508

P3

2.467 2.522 2.522 2.427 2.427 2.467

M1

0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002

M2

0.000 0.002 0.002 0.001

M3

0.002 0.002 0.001

I1

0.000 0.001

I2

0.001

I3
Figure 5. Adults’ biological property difference matrix. Adults’ matrix was created on the adults’
average response pattern. A = animal, P = plant, M = mobile object, I = immobile object.
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A1

A2

A3

P1

P2

P3

M1

M2

M3

I1

I2

I3

A1

0.002 0.998 0.073 0.051 0.064 0.218 0.164 0.164 0.271 1.729 0.218

A2

1.000 0.089 0.063 0.077 0.055 0.000 0.000 0.110 1.890 0.055

A3

0.911 0.937 0.923 0.945 1.000 1.000 0.890 0.890 0.945

P1

0.003 0.001 0.614 0.560 0.560 0.651 1.349 0.613

P2

0.001 0.492 0.437 0.437 0.533 1.467 0.492

P3

0.533 0.478 0.478 0.573 1.427 0.533

M1

0.001 0.001 0.002 1.998 0.002

M2

0.000 0.002 1.998 0.001

M3

0.002 1.998 0.001

I1

2.000 0.001

I2

1.999

I3
Figure 6. Absolute difference of a preschooler’s biological difference matrix from the adults’ biological
difference matrix. A = animal, P = plant, M = mobile object, I = immobile object.
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Figure 7. Mobile model biological property difference matrix. A = animal, P = plant, M = mobile object,
I = immobile object.
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Figure 8. Animal model biological property difference matrix. A = animal, P = plant, M = mobile
object, I = immobile object.
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Figure 9. Immobile model biological property difference matrix. A = animal, P = plant, M = mobile
object, I = immobile object.
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105

Absolute Differences

100
95
90
Adult Model

85
80

Animal Model

75
70

Mobile Model

65
60

Immobile Object
Model

55
1

2

3

4

Testing Session

Figure 10. Preschoolers’ biological response pattern in relation to the adult and hypothetical models.
Standard errors are also provided.
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b: Younger

a: Adults

c: Older
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1.5
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1.5

Animal 2

1

1

1

0.5
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0.5

0

0

0
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-1
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-1.5

-1.5

-1.5

Animal 3
Plant 1
Plant 2
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Mobile 1
Mobile 2
Mobile 3
Immobile 1

-2

-2

-2

Immobile 2

-2.5

-2.5

-2.5

Immobile 3

Figure 11. One dimensional MDS plot of (a) adults’ biological responses, (b) preschoolers’ biological
responding before the median age split, and (c) preschoolers’ biological responding after the median age
split. MDS coordinates for the exemplars are as follows: (a) A1= -1.2046; A2= -1.0846; A3= -1.1443;
P1= -0.8552; P2= -0.8848; P3= -0.7876; M1= 1.0324; M2= 0.9918; M3= 1.0324; I1= 0.9563; I2= 0.9563;
I3= 0.992. (b) A1= -0.6295; A2= -0.4198; A3= -0.1079; P1= -1.4127; P2= -1.2719; P3= -1.5997; M1=
0.9319; M2= 0.9802; M3= 1.3447; I1= 1.0218; I2= 0.9042; I3= 1.0714. (c) A1= -0.5546; A2= -0.9933;
A3= -0.6171; P1= -1.1235; P2= -1.1552; P3= -1.4046; M1= 0.9349; M2= 0.8241; M3= 1.092; I1=
1.0218; I2= 0.9042; I3= 1.0714.
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Figure 12. Preschoolers’ psychological response pattern in relation to the adult and hypothetical models.
Standard errors are also provided.
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b: Younger

a: Adults
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Figure 13. One dimensional MDS plot of (a) adults’ psychological responses, (b) preschoolers’
psychological responding before the median age split, and (c) preschoolers’ psychological responding
after the median age split. MDS coordinates for the exemplar are as follows: (a) A1= -1.6985; A2= 1.6956; A3= -1.6943; P1= 0.3846; P2= 0.1001; P3= 0.2691; M1= 0.6535; M2= 0.7458; M3= 0.6982; I1=
0.7458; I2= 0.7458; I3= 0.7458. (b) A1= -0.9412; A2= -0.3427; A3= -1.3973; P1= -1.1094; P2= -0.8563;
P3= -1.0595; M1= 0.7929; M2= 1.0171; M3= 0.9986; I1= 1.4113; I2= 0.4262; I3= 1.0601.(c) A1= 1.3356; A2= -2.0748; A3= -1.08; P1= -0.1033; P2= -0.1117; P3= -0.2378; M1= 0.4536; M2= 0.5798;
M3= 0.9829; I1= 1.0202; I2= 0.567; I3= 1.3397.
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Figure 14. Absolute differences of preschoolers’ response patterns from adults’ response pattern for the
alive question as the preschoolers aged.
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Figure 15. Preschoolers’ alive response pattern in relation to the adult and hypothetical models. Standard
errors are also provided.
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Figure 16. One dimensional MDS plot of (a) adults’ alive responses, (b) preschoolers’ alive responding
before the median age split, and (c) preschoolers’ alive responding after the median age split (a) A1= 1.6985; A2= -1.6956; A3= -1.6943; P1= 0.3846; P2= 0.1001; P3= 0.2691; M1= 0.6535; M2= 0.7458;
M3=0.6982; I1= 0.7458; I2= 0.7458; I3= 0.7458. (b) A1= -2.0951; A2= -0.4581; A3= -1.2606; P1=
0.965; P2= 0.4086; P3= 0.6868; M1= -0.7042; M2= -0.1478; M3= -0.426; I1= 1.5213; I2= 0.965; I3=
0.5451. (c) A1= -1.5244; A2= -1.572; A3= -1.6682; P1= 0.418; P2= 0.2742; P3= -0.1575; M1= 0.2742;
M2= -0.0136; M3= 0.8497; I1= 1.2094; I2= 0.7778; I3= 1.1324.
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Figure
17. Type of answers offered by the preschoolers in the qualitative condition.
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Testing Session 1

3 Biological
Open Ended
Questions

3 Psychological
Open Ended
Questions

Alive Open
Ended Question

Alive List Open
Ended Question

33 Answers

23 Answers

9 Answers

40 Answers

25 Exemplar 8 Reference
-6 Human -5 Bio. Prop.
-10 Animal -3 Bio. Part
-8 Plant
-1 Objecta

19 Exemplar 4 Reference
-10 Human

-4 Animal
-2 Plant
-3 Objectb

5 Exemplar 4 Reference

-3 Bio. Prop.
-1Bio. Action

33 Exemplar 7 Reference

-3 Animal -2 Bio. Prop.
-1 Bio. Actionc
-2 Plant
-1 Psy. Prop.d

-5 Human

-2 Bio. Prop.
-19 Animal
-1 Bio. Action
-3 Plant
-4 Bio. Part
-3 Objecte
-1 Fic. Char.f
-2 Ambiguousg

Figure 18. Number and types of answers offered by the preschoolers in the qualitative condition at
Testing Session 1. a “not a robot,” b “not a robot,” “giant robot,” “not a box,” c “smile,” d “they scare
people,” e ”drawers,” “computers,” “motors” f “Ariel,” g “clouds,” “forest.”
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-1Object d
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Figure 19. Number and types of answers offered by the preschoolers in the qualitative condition at
Testing Session 2. a “Rapunzel,” b “all stuff,” c “in your dreams,” “remember,” “get sad,” d “a chair
doesn’t,” e“monsters,” f “fairies,” “monster,” “princesses,” g “not mad.”
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Testing Session 3

3 Biological
Open Ended
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Ended Question
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Figure 20. Number and types of answers offered by the preschoolers in the qualitative condition at
Testing Session 3. a “when it’s looking sad,” “…bring blanket and cuddle up,” “if it gets lonely,” “using
imagination” b “clock,” “towels,” “bracelet,” “string,” “shirt” c “storm clouds.”
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Testing Session 4
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Figure 21. Number and types of answers offered by the preschoolers in the qualitative condition at
Testing Session 4. a “pens,” b “they’ll have a dream,” “they think,” “’cause you’re being nice.” c “clock.”
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Adult Responses
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Figure 22. Number and types of answers offered by adults to the qualitative questions. a “not a manmade object,” “a machine that can move without food/water.”
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